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ABSTRACT
Spain has radically changed over the decade of the 1980's. After reaching
stability in its social and political spheres the country has experienced a
remarkable economic growth and prosperity. The pace has been very fast
with rates of growth even higher than the most developed countries in a
trend to catch up them. This process has also been favored by the entry of
Spain in the European Community.
Construction, as a part of the economy, has got out from the deep crisis
this activity was suffering and has grown even much faster than the
economy as a whole. The sector has been fueled by ambitious public
infrastructure programs looking at 1992 as well as the huge private
investment process that has taken place. But now, this positive trend seems
to be threatened. Spanish construction firms are facing 1992 with three
important problems. The unbalances appeared in the economy, the cut in
investment and 1992 represents the end of many projects that seems to
have no continuity. And all this while they have to adjust to the EC-wide
competition.
This thesis is addressed to analyze the reasons that have conduced to the
current situation, its ways out and its effects on construction activity as well
as the impact the EC will have on this sector. In that way it's possible to
get close to what is going to happen to the Spanish construction in the
short and in the long run and what is needed to do from Spanish firms'
point of view.
Thesis Supervisor: Fred Moavenzadeh.
Title: George Macomber Professor of Construction Management.
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Introduction
Spain has experienced a remarkable economic growth over the
decade of the 80's. Construction has accompanied this development
process through major infrastructure projects. Its evolution over the
decade has been particularly important taking into account that was
a sector very damaged after the oil crisis in 1973 and 1981.
In 1985 the recovery of the Spanish construction started. Spanish
construction firms initiated this recovery meeting the demand
completely, in volume and type. The construction effort undertaken
has been huge giving to Spain a modem look quite far form those
years of economic and political isolation.
Year 1992 has represented a symbolic date for Spain. Not only
because of the main events, World Fair Expo'92 and Olympics, but
also the final date for the beginning of the Interior Market within
the European Community and the partipation in the construction of
the Europe of the next century.
Having in mind this date, Spain has been preparing in a very short
period of time its infrastructure. It can be considered that this effort
has taken about 7 years and the construction volume has been huge
if we also add the spectacular private investment flow. The sector
has grow very fast and also construction firms. The quickness of the
process may have been too fast for companies to think beyond 1992,
symbolic year and the final date for the most of the projects.
These good times for Spanish construction offers signs of turning
down. Most of the projects will finish in 1992 and seems not to have
continuity in new ones. The economy is also going through
difficulties. There have been many happy-go-spending year that now
are passing the bill to the economy. Economy that has at the same
time to adjust to the new European scenario.
The purpose of this thesis is just to look beyond 1992. The
opportunities and challenges that are behind 1992 for Spanish
construction firms. It's therefore a good time to stop and think after
some hurry years.
This thesis offers a double character. On the one hand, I analyze
the short term just after 1992 focusing on the evolution the economy
has taken and its influence on construction. On the other hand, the
long run is analyzed being always construction my main point of
attention.
Chapter 1 deals with the general economy's situation offering an
analysis of its evolution over the decade of the 80's. After it, the
current economy's situation is addressed as well as the short-run
porspects for it.
Chapter 2 offers a deep analysis of the Spanish construction sector,
demand and supply. The points addressed are : the evolution of the
sector, its structure, current problems and finally, the evolution and
current situation of 3 sectors particularly related to construction,
cement industry, concrete preparing and construction equipment.
Chapter 3 analyzes the main Spanish general contractors. Their
performance, their strenghts and weaknesses and patterns of
diversification.
Chapter 4 enters in the European Community to compare the
different national construction markets trying to hihglight their
differences and similarities as well as the relationships that are
taking place among them.
Chapter 5 is addressed to asses a short and long-run forescast for
the Spanish construction focusing on the opportunities and
challenges derived from that. This chapter also analyzes the effect
that the new European scenario will introduce in the construction
market as well as a conceptual framework to evaluate some possible
strategies the Spanish firms can take.
Finally, the conclusion collects a general overview of the some
main ideas that, in my opinion, are the key issues of this thesis.
Chapter 1. The General Economy
Many important facts and changes have taken place in Spain
during the last two decades. Spain has became an open economy
very different from those years when it was isolated from the rest of
the world.
The death of General Franco, the last dictatorship of West
Europe, marked a period of transition to a new political order, the
democracy. This gave as a consequence the opening to the rest of
the world mainly to Europe from which Spain has been isolated
maybe to many years.
With a very difficult period of transition the democracy has
consolidated in the Spanish society during the 80's offering a country
social and politically stable and with ambitious projects and
objectives for the future. Among these projects and objectives are
growth, competitiveness and reaching the welfare and wealth
standards of the most developed European countries.
In that way Spain joined to the European Community in 1986 as
well as Portugal. The main objectives of the EC, as the territorial
balance, could help to Spain to reach the necessary infrastructures
network that would give the potential of growth and competitiveness
to face the full integration along the decade of the 90's with dignity.
Table 1.1. MAIN SOClo-POLmICAL FACS IN RECENT YEARS
1.970. Spain signs a Preferential Trade Agreement with the EC.
1.975. Franco dies. Juan Carlos I becomes king.
1.976. 10% devaluation of peseta.
1.977. Unions are legalized. First democratic elections. 20% devaluation of peseta.
1.978. New Spanish Constitution.
1.982. Socialist Party wins elections. 8% devaluation of peseta.
1.986. Spain joints the EC.
1.989. Spain joints to the EMS.
1.991. Maastrich Agreements
Social Agreement of progress. The new economic policy for the
next years.
1.992 Cancellation of 170 items in international trade tariffs.
Free capital movements.
Olympic Games in Barcelona.
World Fair" Expo 92 " in Sevilla.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the achievements carried
out by Spain in these recent years passing from it to see the current
situation of the economy. The distinction of the 80's from the 90's is
justified by the important changes in the economy scenario as well
as in the Government policy. Basically the 80's have been
characterized by a slow economical growth in the first half and a
boom in the second half that made believe in a very good future for
Spain during the 90's, growing more than the average of the EC.
Nevertheless, these good prospects have turned down. A
continuous growth had required some sacrifices and efforts by all
the individuals of the economy. Something that has not occurred.
This situation can also be encouraged by a questionable
Government policy and the main events of 1.992. From my point of
view these main events, although in a circumstantial or indirect way,
have been the worst thing that could happen to Spain as I will
analyze in the following sections.
Recent developments. The 80s
Two main periods in the Spanish economy can be differentiated in
the decade of the 80's. The first period from 1.980 through 1.985
and a second one from 1.985 through 1.990.
The first half of the 80's was characterized by a very low growth,
fall in investment, and therefore an increase in the unemployment
rate and a decrease in the inflation that was around 19 % in 1.981.
Table 1.2 and figure 1.1 illustrate these main facts. The second
energy crisis 1.980/1.982 hit very hard to all the world economy but
Spain also faced a transition in its political and social spherw.
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Table 1.2. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EVOLUTION IN SPAIN,
EC AND OECD. 1981-1991
SPAIN
GDP GFCF Unemploy. Inflatiot
% % rate. % rate. %
-0.2 -3.3 14.4 18.6
1.2 0.5 16.3 17.1
1.8 -2.5 17.7 14.9
1.8 -5.8 20.6 10.9
2.3 4.1 21.8 8.5
3.2 10.0 21.1 11.1
5.6 14.6 20.4 5.9
5.2 14.2 19.3 5.6
4.3 13.2 17.1 6.9
4.2 9.0 16.1 7.3
2.6 3.4 15.8 6.6
nancial Times 11/91 and European Co
The GFCF fell very sharply in this period as consequence of two
reasons primarily : The oil crisis of 1980/1982 and the socio political
uncertainty brought by this new period'. The negative increase in
GFCF during the period 81-84 of -11% is quite far from the one
1 Research Associates
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corresponding to the EC, 0%, although the GDP's in this period are
quite similar.
The result of this first half of the 80's was:
- Sharp increase in unemployment rates from 14,4% in 1981 to
21,8% in 1985 while the EC, although with a similar trend, only
dis from 7,7% in 1981 to 10,8% in 1985.
- Inflation fell 11.6% in Spain for the same period while the fall
was 4,8% in the EC, being the inflation in Spain close to the EC
rate in 1985 ( 8.5 % in Spain vs 6.1% in the EC ).
The deeper analysis of these facts reveals that Spain, with a lack of
infrastructure and equipment, even before 1980, continued putting
more distance in its deficiencies in comparison with its more
developed neighbors of the EC. A country that wants to grow also
has to save and to invest. Investment is an strategic factor to achieve
growth and competitiveness in the long run. In the period 1974/1985
the GDP of Spain increased a 17% while GFCF fell -23%'.
1 Euroconstruct.roco str ct.
Other lesson could be learned from this process. This is the 8%
devaluation of the peseta in 1982 as a result of the unsustainable
balances in the current account that Spain had.
The second period starts from 1985 and is quite different from the
one describe before. Spain grew faster than any other country in the
EC and also faster than the OCDE on average. Reasons to such
growth can be summarized as follows:
- The international economy expansion after 1983 pushed by
countries like US and Japan'.
- Stabilization of social tensions through agreements Unions-
Government-Companies.
- The situation from which Spain began this phase. Particularly
high unemployment. 21,8% in 1985.
- Entry in the EC increasing the private companies' confidence
in the future of Spain booming the investment. There was a lot
of distance to gain if Spain was going to accommodate its low
standards as rent per capita to the EC standards.
1 Seopan.n.
- The Government began an investment program in
infrastructures with its multiplying effect.
- Entry of many foreign investors aimed not only by the high
interest rates in Spain but also by the potential of the Spanish
market in the future.
In this period some figures are relevant. Spanish GDP grew 24,8%
between 1985 and 1990 while the EC, on average, only did 18%.
Investment as GFCF grew 65,1% by the same period. Almost
double in comparison with the growth of investment in the EC,
31,2%. The unemployment rate fell to 16,0% but it's still very far
from the EC rate, 8,5%.
Now, this good situation of the Spanish economy seems to be
threatened by two very important balances : (1) Inflation and (2)
Current account unbalance. Actually the prospects on the future of
the Spanish economy have modified radically over the last months
of 1991'.
1 Seopan. Master in Construction.
In the next section this two sources of unbalance will be exposed
trying to asses an immediate, short-medium term, forecast for the
incoming years. This forecast could be a very important foundation
to know how the construction sector will be affected.
The decade of the 90k The curent situation
Spain represents de 11,50% of the EC population being the fifth
after West Germany, Italy, UK and France. In contrast its GDP only
represents the 7,80% of the whole EC GDP being also the fifth.
This means that is rent per capita is just two thirds of the EC
average. Table 1.3 illustrates some of these data.
Table 1.3. POPULATION AND RENT PER CAPITA IN THE EC.
1991
Country Population % EC GDP. $ Billions % EC GDP $.GDP/Capita.
Millions.1991 population 1991 1991
SPAIN 39.7 11.51 510,0 7.80 12.850
FRANCE 56.8 16.47 1.300,0 19.90 22.900
WEST
78.5 22.70 1.600,0 24.50 25.500
GERMANY
BELGIUM 9.9 2.87 211,0 3.20 21.280
HOLLAND 15.0 4.35 291,0 4.50 19.400
UK 57.4 16.64 1.100,0 16.80 19.163
IRELAND 3.5 1.02 44,7 0.7 12.800
DENMARK 5.1 1.47 135,0 2.10 26.150
PORTUGAL 10.5 3.04 75,8 1.20 7.240
GREECE 10.2 2.95 75,0 1.10 7.300
ITALY 57.9 16.78 1.180,0 18.10 20.300
LUXEMBURG 0.4 0.12 10,0 0.20 26.200
TOTAL EC 344.9 100 6.532,0 100 18.940
Source: Actualidad Economica and European Commission.
Considering these differences and also the ones that will be
described in the following chapter with regard to infrastructures,
equipment, housing, etc. Spain seems to be a very good potential
market for the industry with special consideration for the
construction sector. Other different thing is the speed in that this
developments will be achieved. The long run seems to have good
prospects but the short-medium run offers some signs of doubt.
The trend of growth experienced in Spain in the last half of the
80's seems to have been cut in the last years, 1990 and 1991,
although it continues higher than the EC on average as was shown
in table 1.2. This makes to arise an obvious question. Why has it
happened ?.
There can be many reasons but it's better to group these reasons
in two wide groups : (1) Potential possibilities and (2) Reasons
derived from the economy's equilibrium. Among the ones included
in the first group are those related with an encompassed growth of
human capital, lack of infrastructure, social tensions or lack of
strategic resources. These ones act as real constraints.
The second group are those related with the equilibrium in the
economy. All countries desire to achieve two main goals : first,
internal balance through full employment and prices stability and
second, external balance through a balance of payments close to 01.
A country that wants to follow an steady growth without suffering
hard recessions has to control successfully all the sources that work
impeding such trend. Here is where is crucial not only the role of
the society as a sum of all the individuals of a country but also and
not less important the role of the Government because of its weight
in the economy and capacity to drive the behavior of the country's
economy more or less successfully.
Looking at tables 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 we can see some data that
reveal some clues of what is going on:
1
Dornbusch and Fisher. MACROECONOMICS.
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Table 1.4. INFLATION AND INTEREST RATES. SPAIN AND THE
EC.
SPAIN (*) EC (*)
Year
Nominal NominalInflation Real Interest Inflation Real Interest
interest Interest
1985 8.5 13.4 4.9 6.1 10.9 4.8
1986 11.1 11.4 0.3 5.6 9.2 3.6
1987 5.9 12.8 6.9 4.1 9.4 5.3
1988 5.6 11.8 6.2 4.6 9.4 4.8
1989 6.9 13.8 6.9 5.1 9.9 4.8
1990 7.3 14.7 7.4 5.7 11.1 5.4
1991 6.6 12.4 5.8 5.5 10.4 4.9
() Long term Government Bonds
Source: Financial Times. 11/91. European Commission.
In first place can be noted that the inflation rate in Spain is
worsening above EC average during these last years. The 6,6% in
Spain vs the 5,5% in the EC makes Spanish goods less competitive
damaging the export industry as well as other sectors depending on
it such as the possibility of Spanish construction firms bidding in
European countries or tourism, sector that has been very damaged
in this last period.
Secondly Spain continues with the highest unemployment rate
Table 1.5. SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT IN SPAIN. 1986-1990.
SPAIN In % of GDP
Current Private Public Private Total Public
Year
Account Savings Investment Investment Investment Savings
1986 1.7 22.0 3.7 16.1 19.8 -0.5
1987 0.1 20.3 3.5 18.3 21.8 -1.6
1988 -1.1 20.5 3.9 19.7 23.6 1.9
1989 -2.9 19.4 4.4 21.0 25.4 3.1
1990 -3.6 n.a n.a na. 26.4 n.a
1991 -2.9 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Source : Bank of Spain.
15,8% in Spain vs the 8,6% in the EC on average. How can a
country as Spain have this rate of inflation being so far from the full
employment rate ?. Two set of reasons could be argued:
- First is that the 16% of unemployment can not be true. That is,
maybe the records are not well kept or there are a good deal of
hidden economies out of the control of the government. In this
way it can be explained how an expansionary policy finishes
generating a high inflation.
- Second are those reasons related with structural deficiencies.
Such as mobility of labor in two dimensions, intersectorial and
geographically. The main two sectors generating higher inflation
rates have been services and construction. The high demand
addressed to these two sector has been the direct cause of their
price rising. In the case of construction this has been particularly
important. The pressure to finish the main 92 works and their
concentration in 3 geographical areas as Madrid, Barcelona and
Sevilla along with other major jobs in the rest of the country
have given as result the highest real wages through years.
Table 1.6. EVOLUTION OF GDP AT COST OF FACTORS.
YEARS 1982 TO 1990
RELATIVE STRUCTURE
ANNUAL GROWTH
SECTOR CHANGE % (%)
Nominal Prices Real 1982 1990 Nominal Prices Real
Agriculture 78.75 47.58 21.12 6.76 4.85 7.53 4.99 2.42
and fishing
Industry 122.63 74.38 27.67 28.23 25.27 10.52 7.20 3.10
Construction 205.66 99.30 53.37 7.63 9.38 14.99 9.00 5.49
Services 162.29 97.33 32.92 57.38 60.50 12.81 8.87 3.62
GDP 148.76 88.17 32.20 100.00 100.00 12.06 8.22 3.55
Source: Revista de Economia.11.1991
In third place has to be considered the interaction with foreign
countries, that is, the international trade and capital flows among
Spain and the rest of the world. Table 1.7 shows that Spain has as
percentage of its GDP a large current account deficit of -2.9% in
1991. But more important has been its path. With a negative
balance during four consecutive years from 1988 and also expected -
3.0% in 1992. The main reason for this situation can be described as
a positive differential in inflation rate in comparison with the rest of
developed countries and the appreciation of the peseta. Figure 1.2
shows the path followed by the exchange rate in comparison with
EC and OCDE countries.
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Table 1.7.CURRENT ACCOUNT IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES.
(% OF GDP)
COUNTRY 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
UK -0.8 -1.9 -4.1 -4.1 -3.0 -2.8 -
BELGIUM 2.0 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7
DENMARK -5.5 -3.0 -1.8 -1.8 -1.3 -0.8
WEST
4.4 4.1 4.1 4.5 4.3 5.1
GERMANY
GREECE -5.3 -3.1 -1.7 -4.9 -4.6 -4.6
SPAIN 1.7 0.1 -1.1 -2.9 -3.6 -2.9 -3.0
FRANCE 0.5 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -
IRELAND -2.9 1.3 1.8 1.6 1.2 0.7 -
ITALY 0.5 -0.2 -0.6 -1.3 -1.1 -1.5 -
LUXEMBUR 39.4 31.6 34.3 32.1 30.0 28.0 -
HOLLAND 2.7 1.4 2.4 3.2 3.0 3.1 -
PORTUGAL 2.4 -0.4 -4.4 -1.2 -1.2 -1.8 -
EUROPE 1.4 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 -
JAPAN 4.3 3.7 2.8 2.2 2.1 2.0 -
US -3.2 -3.4 -2.4 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -
Source: Bank of Spain and CE.
Looking at the other side of the international flows we can find
that the central reserves, Government reserves of foreign assets,
have increased spectacularly during the last years. Figures 1.3 shows
the path followed by the central reserves.
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With the current volume of reserves Spain is at the beginning of
1992 the third country in volume of reserves. The two first countries
are Japan and US'.
How can this be squared with a large current account deficit?.
The answer brings about the question of the private capital inflows.
1 Mercado n.529.3/23/1992
This has been a key fact to keep the balance of payments within a
huge surplus but its effects on the Spanish economy and national
investment and industry have other different character.
To begin with the analysis of these international facts the first
point to address is the evolution of the foreign investment in Spain
during the last six years.
Table 1.8. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SPAIN.
Source: Bank of Spain.
From 1985 the capital inflow in Spain has been spectacular in all
the three main items exposed in table 1.8. But the trend can be
divided in two periods. One from 1986 to 1989 and other from 1990
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SPAIN. (.000.000.000 Pesetas)
DIRECT PORTFOLIO IN REAL NET
YEAR STATE INVESTMENT
INVESTMENT DISINVESTMENT BUYS SALES BUYS SALES
1986 321.2 37.1 501.0 226.0 194.9 4.4 749.6
1987 443.6 122.1 1482.9 1048.1 227.9 6.5 976.9
1988 691.3 170.2 1221.2 965.0 274.7 7.4 1044.6
1989 866.1 138.7 1774.0 1041.3 311.3 8.1 1763.3
1990 1061.0 165.3 1508.2 1090.2 243.7 13.5 1543.9
1991 1044.5 263.8 2348.3 1801.1 143.6 7.3 1464.2
to 1991. The former is characterized by an increase in all the three
items direct investment, portfolio and real state. The second has a
systematic fall in the net investment and also a shift of the character
of the investment. This second period has been coincident with the
beginning of a restrictive monetary policy of the Government has
given as result a fall in direct investment ( foreign and national ) but
the foreign portfolio investment has continued increasing
spectacularly while the real state investment has also fallen.
What can be the reason for such shift ?. The main reason that can
be argued is that has been an speculative attack from foreigners.
The high interest rates offered in Spain have driven to an
appreciation of the peseta due to the pressure of foreign investors.
Even more, the threat of a possible devaluation keeps pushing the
interest rates to be high anticipating the effect of a devaluation.
Direct investment, although still important, has fallen as result of a
very high peseta from the foreigners point of view. Their position in
Spain has been worsened by the high inflation and high peseta from
the point of view of a platform to export from. The domestic
investment by national firms also has declined as a result of high
interest rates. But looking at table 1.9 other conclusion can be set.
The capital flow in foreign direct investment in Spain has been
much higher that the Spanish capital outflow in direct investment
abroad. Even more, the 0,4% in 1989 ( as % of GDP ) is really less
if we consider that almost a 25% of this investment has been carried
out by filials of foreign firms set in Spain1.
Table 1.9. DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD OF SOME
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.
Source: Revista de Economia.1991
1 EXPANSION. 3/18/1992.
DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD (in billion dollars)
Annual Average 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 % GDP
1975-79 1980-84 1989
OUTFLOW
France 1.6 2.9 2.2 5.4 9.2 14.5 19.0 2.0
Germany 3.0 3.6 5.0 10.1 9.2 11.2 13.6 1.1
Italy 0.4 1.4 1.9 2.7 2.3 5.5 2.0 0.2
UK 6.2 9.3 11.1 16.5 31.1 37.1 32.0 3.8
Belg-Lux 0.6 0.2 0.3 1.7 2.8 3.8 6.8 4.4
Holland 3.4 4.6 3.2 4.4 8.7 3.6 10.0 4.5
Spain 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.5 0.4
INFLOW
France 1.9 2.3 2.6 3.3 5.1 8.5 10.3 1.1
Germany 1.3 0.7 0.5 1.1 1.9 1.3 6.6 0.6
Italy 0.6 1.0 1.0 -0.1 4.1 6.7 2.5 0.3
UK 4.2 5.3 4.6 7.1 14.1 16.5 32.2 3.8
Belg-Lux 1.1 1.2 1.0 0.7 2.4 5.2 7.1 4.6
Holland 1.1 1.7 1.5 4.1 3.1 3.9 6.2 2.8
Spain 0.9 1.7 2.0 3.5 4.6 7.0 8.4 2.2
Final Comments
As a last view for the current Spanish economy's situation we don't
have to forget the Maastrich Agreements that set the conditions for
the EC countries to enter in the third phase of the EMS in 1999.
These conditions are :
- Exchange rate : Situated in the narrow band (+/- 2.5%) in the
EMS; without devaluating in two years.
- Inflation less than 1.5% higher than the 3 countries with lower
inflation.
- Public debt less than 60% of the GDP.
- Public deficit less than 3% of the GDP.
- Long term interest rate less than 2% higher than the 3
countries with the lower long term interest rate.
At this moment, the end of 1991, the convergence position of the
EC countries is as follows in Table 1.10.
As it can be seen Spain only meets at this moment one of the
Maastrich conditions while the most powerful countries in the EC
meet almost an average of 3 conditions.
Table 1.10. CONVERGENCE SITUATION
POSITION OF CONVERGENCE.1991
Country Inflation Public Long Term Public #
Deficit Interest Debt Indicators met
Belgium 3.2* -6.3 9.2* 125.4 2
Denmark 2.4* -1.7* 9.0* 67.2 3
Germany 3.5* -3.6 8.4* 46.2* 3
Greece 18.3 -17.3 16.3 96.4* 1
Spain 5.9 -4.4 12.1 45.6* 1
France 3.0* -1.5* 9.3* 37.2* 4
Italy 6.4* -9.9 11.2 101.2 0
Luxemburg 3.4 1.9* 8.9* 4.7* 4
Holland 3.2 -4.4 8.7* 78.8 2
Portugal 11.7 -5.4 12.8 64.7 0
UK 6.5 -1.9* 9.7* 43.8 3
Ireland 3.0* -4.1 9.1* 102.8
* Indicators met.
Source: Seopan and EUROSTAT
The most important problems of Spain are its high unemployment
rate, high inflation rate, and its current account deficit. Not less
important is its public deficit of 4.4% of GDP that would be higher
if we considered the almost 2 Trillion pesetas ( $ 20 Billion ) that
the Government owes to private Spanish firms. From this figure 0,75
Trillion pesetas belongs to Construction firms1. At this moment the
public debt could be around 8% with these considerations being
very far from the Maastrich conditions.
Therefore with the situation exposed before and if the Maastrich
Agreement conditions are not changed before 1997 the economic
policy to follow by Spain would be addressed to fight against the
indicators that would impede the entry in the EMS. The public
deficit calls for a recession and cut in government spending. This
decision could be dramatic for the Spanish needs of infrastructure
that would mean a higher distance in productivity and wealth. Other
possibility is a higher control of the Government spending trying to
make it as efficient as possible like Germany does, and finally
developing a solution for the public companies that have
systematically huge loses in their results. This last possibility could
well suggest a change of administration because of the habits
acquired over the years that can't change overnight.
On the other hand it would be needed a discretionary policy to cut
consumption. This could fix the current account deficit and allocate
1MERCADO n. 529.3/23/1992
a higher portion on savings, figure that has been declining in the last
years. The investment in the country has been carried out from
foreign lending rather than national savings. As result, the financial
capability of the country has been decreasing in the same amount
than the current account deficit.
But this is not the end of the story. The peseta has been anomaly
appreciated by an speculative attack from foreign investors and now,
when a devaluation could take place, the interest rates have to keep
high to attract foreign funds. As a consequence of a high peseta and
higher inflation rates the export industry has been killed as it's the
case of tourism, the Spanish traditional source of divisas and current
account surpluses. Also, it has been affected the way out of Spanish
firms to establish in the rest of the EC market away of the Spanish
borders while the reverse has been facilitated. Even more, the high
interest rates have also damaged to the investment. The country as a
whole has spend in present consumption rather than in future, that
is investment.
With the situation exposed it seems that Spain will depend more
from the structural funds from the EC to develop its infrastructure
networks because it has to control its public deficit. But the
pressures of Germany and UK to delay the EC Budget could have
negative effects on the Spanish urgent needs of infrastructure1.
A delay in such funds will obligate to look for other alternative
financing schemes that will be described with more detail in
following chapters. Therefore the needs are obvious but the time to
develop them could take longer time that was expected in 1986.
Other EC priorities, as East countries could influence the process.
As a final thought for this chapter I would like to include an
interesting article regarding to the competitiveness of the Spanish
national firms in the new economic order after 19922.
" The role of a Government is not only to seek for a
macroeconomic equilibrium. There exits a wide field to act and
influence the global competitiveness of a country : improvements in
infrastructure but also in human and capital resources, ..., diffusion
of necessary information for decision making, support to
SMERCADO.529.3/23/1992
2 Revista de Economia. Josep Pique
internationalization, microeconomic sensibility to implement fiscal
policies, etc.... But, besides all this, the government can contribute in
a good way to take strategic positions supporting the creation of
powerful and competitive industrial groups, not via protectionism in
a market economy context, but via favorable fiscal schemes to
processes of concentration and internationalization. It's not coherent
to follow a liberalization policy in the industrial markets keeping no
market schemes in other sectors as the energy...
Our neighbors offer to us clear examples of this type of strategic
behavior by their respective governments that consider individuals of
high interest to the large national firms and, above all, to the ones
with international projection, with independence of their equity
composition.
Unfortunately, the only active industrial policy practiced in the last
years has been the structural change of large sector with dominant
or significance presence of public capital in general. Once this
process finished there hasn't been a continuity in such industrial
policy.
The balance of this politic attitude is still to do, with a certain
methodological and temporary distance. However, as a consequence
of all the exposed before, it's estimated that around the 30% of the
Spanish firms capital is in foreign hands and almost a half of our
industrial product is controlled by foreign capital. This would not be
preoccupying if a significant process in the reverse direction existed.
As all people know, it isn't so. And it gives the impression -sad
impression- we are losing our last opportunities".
I can be said that the Government has designed a new policy in
the last months oriented in the way described before but it seems
that these are timid measures which effect depends of the success of
their implementation and the power and way their implementation
is carried out. Maybe the Government is too much worried about
the Maastrich conditions rather than the internal conditions.
As a conclusion for this chapter, and from my personal view it
seem that the euphoria looking at 1992 will pass and bring a new,
more realistic, order that will require more efforts and sacrifices by
all the individuals of the economy.
Chapter 2. The Spanish Construction Sector
It's well known that the Construction activity is very affected by the
ups and downs of the general economy. It follows that when the
economy experiences an expansion, consumption grows less than
proportionately to the GDP growth, therefore investment, as a part
of the savings, increases more than proportionately and the growth
in investment is higher than the GDP growth. In this context and
considering that construction represents the need for infrastructure
and fixed capital for other sector it's easy to asses that is a part of
the investment.
At this point is fair to recognize three basic characteristics of the
Construction Sector. First is that the Construction Sector is highly
sensible to the economy waves, more than other industrial sectors.
This means that in a boom its growth is higher than the rest of the
industry but in recessions it's lower. Second is that there is a time
gap between the peaks and the valleys of the economy waves and
the peaks and valleys of the Construction sector as a consequence of
that is activity is related with the needs from other sectors. The third
characteristic is a direct consequence of the first two. The
construction sector is the last one in reaching the expansionary
waves of the economy and the first in leaving them. In that way
firms should plan in a long term prospective anticipating such ups
and downs. Figure 2.1 clarifies the facts described above.
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But behind these behavior characteristics of the sector in the
context of the general economy there are other group of
characteristics that give to the Construction activity its own
personality that can be described as follows :
- The work is done outdoors in general. Although there is a
growing trend towards prefabrication.
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- Its product isn't repetitive. Each work differs from the
previous and the future ones. The differences are based on:
different owners, types, soil conditions, geographical
locations, requirements, schedules, etc.. This makes the sector
to be not susceptible of standardization and it has to adapt its
structure to the specific demands in each project.
- The internal organization of construction firms is far form
bureaucracy schemes and requires flat and flexible
organizations with a good deal of decentralization in the
authority and decision making. The larger the size of the
company the higher degree of decentralization.
- Heavy dependent on local labor and suppliers to make less
expensive the product. This requires good knowledge of the
area where a certain project is undertaken.
The evolution of the sector in the last two decades has had a
different periods to distinguish. The first one between 1974 and 1985
hit very hard to the construction sector as was exposed in the first
chapter. During this period companies suffered a hard decrease in
its volume and many of them went into bankruptcy. To set some
figure in this period GDP grew 17% while the construction did -
23% ( both in real terms ). The unemployment in the sector was
huge. The second period 1985 through 1990 has been quite
different. GDP grew 24% while construction did 52% (both in real
terms ). The construction sector as well as the economy as a whole
have experienced a boom.
The balance of the whole period 1974-90 is that GDP grew 47%
while Construction did a net 27% growth. This result gives to think
that the whole period hasn't been able to encompass the economic
activity with the stock of infrastructures that the nation would
require. This issue will continue limiting the productive capacity of
the nation to reach higher levels of competitiveness and wealth. But
the gap opened in this phase might increase in the next coming
years to judge by the recent expectations about the economy and the
path that the activity is taking.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze how the construction
sector is structured in Spain. The clients, the firms, the cost of the
output, etc.
The demand side
The production in the Construction Sector in Spain was about 6.5
Trillion pesetas in 1991 that represents approximately the 9,4% of
the total domestic output as it was set in table 1.6 in the previous
chapter. Its current volume situates itself in the third place in
economic importance just after the services and the rest of the
industry. The population employed in the sector was about 1,22
Million in 1990 representing the 9,7% of the total national
employees. In the same year the active population in the sector was
about 1,43 Million that means that the unemployment rate of the
sector was 14,9%1.
After introducing these relevant data about the sector it is
important to describe how the construction output is allocated
among the different clients of construction companies. In first place
the clients can be divided in two generic groups, the private and the
public sector, then several subsectors can be added. Table 2.1 can
serve to show the distribution of construction clients.
1 Seopan
Table 2.1. PRODUCTION BY TYPE OF CLIENTS
It's important to note the weight of the public sector on the overall
production that represented a 32,5% of the total output in 1991.
The public sector :
The general administration in Spain can be divided for the
purposes of the thesis in 4 generic groups :
PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR TOTAL
1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991
BUILDING 7.4 6.3 45.9 45.3 53.3 51.6
1.1 Housing 1.5 1.7 22.1 19.6 23.6 21.3
1.2 Others 5.6 4.6 23.8 25.7 29.7 30.3
CIVIL 20.0 22.6 6.2 6.0 26.2 28.6
RENOVATION 3.6 3.6 16.9 16.2 20.5 19.8
TOTAL 31.0 32.5 69.0 67.5 100.0 100.0
ource : Seopan. Master in Construction 1991.
1- The Central Administration. Its main responsible for
public works in the MOPT ( Ministery of Public Works and
Transportation).
2- The rest of the Central Administration that is formed by
other ministeries whose weight in the volume of public works
is much less than the one before. These are : Education
Ministery, The Public Health Ministery and others.
3- The Regional Administrations.
4- The Local Administration. They are formed by the City
Councils and the Province Councils.
The share of the public investment in construction by each one of
the public organisms can be allocated as it's shown in table 2.2. At it
can be seen there is an important reduction, -31,9% in real terms, in
public bids from 1990 to 1991 but also the degree of
decentralization in those bids has increased. This is a part of the
normal evolution that is taking place in the country. Regional and
local administrations take every year a higher responsibility to
develop each own infrastructures. This fact can be analyzed in more
detail taking a longer temporary serie. Figure 2.2 shows the
evolution of the share in the public bids by type of public
administration.
Table 2.2. SHARE OF EACH TYPE OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION IN THE WHOLE PUBLIC BIDS
ADMINISTRATION 1990 (%) *1991 (%) CHANGE (90-91)
G.D. Roads 28.14 13.8 -66.5
G.D. Hydraulic 6.38 6.4 -31.9
G.D. Harbors 3.40 5.6 12.4
G.D. Infrastr. 1.53 2.9 30.1
Rest MOPT 4.33 4.5 -29.3
TOTAL MOPT 43.78 33.3 -48.3
Minis. Educat 3.25 5.0 3.7
Public Health 1.48 1.3 -41.0
Others 2.60 3.8 0.5
Rest CENTRAL AD 7.34 10.1 -6.5
TOTAL CENTRAL 51.12 43.3 -42.3
REGION ADMINIS 30.26 39.2 -11.9
City Councils 13.65 14.0 -30.4
Provin Councils 4.95 3.5 -51.6
LOCAL ADMINIS 18.61 17.5 -36.2
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 -31.9
* 1990 Total Volume : 2.079.027 Million Pesetas.
* 1991 Total Volume : 1.415.486 Million Pesetas of 1990.
Source : Seopan.
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As it can be seen the decentralization in the political sphere in the
country has introduced the decentralization of investment in
infrastructures too. This has an important implication for
construction firms, the public customers tend to decentralize,
therefore, their organizations ( in the case of those companies of
national scope ) have to take that into account. Also, it must be
noted that the large program in infrastructures carried out in the
last years has produced a large share for the Central Administration
that in the future won't be so, increasing the importance of the
Regional and Local Administrations.
The other side of the public contracts is the way that these
contracts are awarded, that is, the public bidding. There are four
major systems : (1) Competitive bid, where the contracts are
awarded to the lowest bid, (2) Select list with competitive bidding,
basically the same that the first but with previous admission
requirement, (3) Concourse where the criteria are based on
reputation, previous experience, bid, schedule, etc, and (4) The
direct award to a particular firm that is limited by law to small
projects or urgent ones.
Figures 2.3 through 2.5 represent the share of each system and the
average project size in each.
Figure 2.3. Share of each award system
in the total number of public awards.(1989)
(34%)
Competie bid
(27%) _ _ __eeti Solecd list
(25%)
Source: Seopan. Master in Construction 1991.
(14%)
Figure 2.4. Share of each award system
in the total amount of public contracting.(1989)
IFall
SDirect Conract
* Competitive bid
(10%) Cor
SSelect Rlt
(16%)
(67%)
Source : Seopan. Master in Construction 1991.
Figure 2.5. Average Poject Size
4504e -
360-
300-
260-
200-
150-
100-
50
0
in each bidding system. 1989
In Million pesetas.U
Direct Cont. Select List Concomurse Compel bid
Source : Seopan. Master in Construction 1991.
m
It can be noted the absence of other systems like the negotiated
contract or lump sum bids. The common system followed in Spain is
based in the unit-price, therefore, a big deal of risks about
quantities, maybe all, is shifted to the Public Administration. This is
natural in a context where projects are not designed by the
construction-engineering firms that later will be in charge of
construction. This also makes the firms unable to quantify risks and
therefore they don't take it. Change Orders, modifications, etc. are
then very usual and the initial budget can suffer an strong increase
during the execution phase. Many times the projects haven't a
detailed design because projects are done urgently, etc.
The official bidding system in Spain is quite far from the common
systems in the EC where concourses are the main figures of the
public bidding. The regulation in the EC is to give access in the
public bidding to foreign firms. The contracts are published in
domestic currency as well as in ECU but the reality is that only 1%
of the contracts are awarded to foreign companies.
The Public Administration is Spain is now reviewing the Law of
Public Contracts that will try to fix some of the common mistakes
that have been presenting over the years such as :
- Avoiding the continuous modifications and Change Orders.
- New criteria to select contractors. Attending to other
criteria besides the minimum bid one.
- Opening to foreign construction firms. The process of this
opening will be gradual but the process to an unique market
is unavoidable'.
The private sector :
The demand for construction in the private sector in Spain
represented the 67,5% of the total construction output in 1991, that
is around 4,40 Trillion pesetas ( $ 44 Billion )
It's remarkable the share of the Commercial ( non housing)
building subsector. This subsector has been growing during the 80's
as a response for the growing demand in : (1) Commercial Centers,
92) Offices, (3) Industrial and Business Centers and (4) Leisure
1 Seopan. Master in Construction.
Spaces. Its current share is 38 %, the largest in the private sector.
Its boom can be related also to the boom in investment during the
period 1986-90. But now its evolution is something uncertain. This
segment of the market is highly related to Real State1.
The following sectors in importance are: (1) Housing, (2)
renovation and (3) Civil Engineering. The last one and least
important in volume is in current recession due to the fall in
investment. Housing represents also and important share of the
market but as will be described in later chapters its evolution is
somehow uncertain too. Renovation seems to be more stable, even
growing in the future.
Figure 2.6 shows the share of the different types of construction in
the private sector. The main differences from the public sector are
based in the larger size of the market as well as more specific
requirements and a more sophisticated sector. Quality and schedule
are the main selection criteria. The price, though important, plays a
second role in importance.
1 Expansion 3/18/92Expansion 3/18/92
Figure 2.6. Demand for Construction
in the Private Sector. 1991
m
•
E%)
CMa
Source : Seopan (38%)
The contracting system uses to be the direct contract as well as
lump sum and negotiated contracts but without the concurrence of a
large number of firms to the same contract, maybe no more than
one or two. Repeated clients based on reputation and past
experiences is the usual way.
The segments of demand in the private sector are a larger number
than in the public sector and its scope is broader. The access to this
type of contracts and the knowledge of the particular needs of the
client as well as the client itself makes this part of the market
subject to an extra marketing effort by the construction firms. This
sector will have a very important role in the future, a process where
the public sector will have to decrease its share in the aggregate
construction demand giving entry to an stronger private sector that
will be the main protagonist.
The Supply Side
The analysis of the supply side of the Spanish Construction is a
different subject due to the lack of information and the difficulty to
get data from a sector that is very fragmented and many times the
owners, particularly in building construction, act as construction
managers for themselves working closely with subcontractors
specialized in the different required areas.
Nevertheless, the effort carried out in the last years by the MOPT
trying to make surveys about the structure of the supply side of the
sector, could help us to give a better knowledge of it.
A first classification we could make would be based on the size of
the companies as table 2.3 reveals. It can be seen how small
companies play a very important role in the whole output. This can
give a very good idea of the fragmented the market is as it's
supposed to be according to the particular characteristics of the
construction activity. Table 2.3 doesn't include the huge number of
independent workers that many times work on subcontracted basis
and other times in tasks of maintenance and repairing. They can't
be classified as firms due to the lack of a proper structure as them'.
Table 2.3. STRUCTURE OF THE SUPPLY BY SIZE OF FIRMS.
(1988)
TOTAL # PRODUCTION (3)/(2)
# FIRMS
EMPLOYEE (Million Pts) (Million
# EMPLOYEES (2)/(1)(1)
S (3) Pts)
(2)
< 10 58.145 244.062 1.389.539 4.19 5.693
10 to 20 4.565 65.682 465.288 14.4 7.065
TOTAL SMALL 62.710 309.744 1.854.827 4.94 5.988
20 To 50 1.915 62.675 455.607 32.7 7.269
50 To 200 703 61.097 461.018 86.9 7.546
TOTAL
2.618 123.772 916.625 47.3 7.406
MEDIUM
> 200. LARGE 115 101.073 1.165.162 878.9 11.528
T OTAL 65.443 534.589 3.936.614 8.168 7.363
It hasn't been included the production and number of independent workers)
Source : MOPU. Construction Structure. 1988.
1 In 1988 there were 184.602 independent workers with and average of 2.2 employees. Their
production was 1.033.617 Million pesetas.
The average production by employees was 7,363 Million pesetas in
1988 being higher the larger the size of the company. An average
size of company produced 7,36 Million pesetas per employee in
1988 while the larger companies ( > 200 employees ) produced 11,5
Million pesetas per employee in the same year. Large companies (
> 200 employees ) have a remarkable productivity in comparison
with the smaller ones. Some reasons that could be argued can be
the following:
- Better production and organization schemes as a
consequence of higher management quality and specialization
of job positions.
- The size of projects and its duration is larger in general
allowing to achieve better learning curves.
- Higher use of equipment in the case of larger companies
increasing the labor productivity.
- A factor of correction. The companies use to have other
activities different from construction whose productivity could
be higher and the statistic might not show it.
- More bargaining power with suppliers because of its
volume, therefore, the company retains a higher value added
for itself given the same output.
Also it's remarkable the number of small companies ( 1 to 20
employees ) in the total number in this industry. The number of
small companies reached 62.710 in 1988 representing the 95,82% of
the total national number. On the other hand, as it shown in Figure
2.7 the value added by them represented 47,11% of the whole
output. But this same figure reveals other important clue. The
medium size companies have a share in the output of 23,28% while
the large companies have 29,59 %. Hence, the output of the sector
is polarized in the small and large companies while the medium
companies retain an smaller share due to its number that is
relatively low in comparison with the other two groups.
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But, what about specialization ?. From the total number of
construction companies, 65.443 in 1988, it can be made a breakdown
by specialties.
Table 2.4. BREAKDOWN BY COMPANYS MAIN ACTIVITY
(1980-1988)
% of total # % of total #
Specialty #.1980 #. 1988
1980 1988
Building 15.703 44.11 34.338 52.47
Civil Engineering 851 2.39 1.536 2.34
Build. Subcontrac. 18.566 52.15 28395 43.38
Not differentiated 480 1.35 1.174 1.79
T OTAL 35.600 100.00 65.443 100.00
Source: MOPU. INE. 1988
The period 1980-1988 has produced significant changes on the
specialization of companies or at least in their main activities. There
are much more companies whose main activity is related to building
construction while the proportion of building subcontractors have
decreased. Civil engineering still remains in the same percentage of
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the total number in 1988 but the not differentiated companies have
growth, maybe as a consequence of a product diversification.
The following step in analyzing the supply would be the
geographical scope of the firms. Unfortunately, there aren't
complete data published in such matter. It can be said that there are
16 Spanish Companies working abroad and all are included in the
large size ( > 200 employees ). The foreign construction markets
have been decreasing during the period 1985-1990, almost to the
half and represented about 45.000 Million pesetas in 1990, a 0,8%
of the internal production. This reduction might be explained due to
the high internal demand and other factors such as the appreciation
of peseta and the financing problems of the countries where these
exports were carried out, North African countries and South
American countries. 20 Large size companies also operate in
national scope while the rest of large size and medium size
companies are regionally distributed in one or several regions. On
the other hand, small companies have a local scope'.
It's important to mention the construction abroad. Some Spanish
1 Seopan. Master in Construction 1991.
companies are making a tremendous effort going abroad to compete
but also, as will be analyzed in the fourth chapter, the reverse is also
taking place in a larger flow. Nowadays there are more than 28
European established permanently in Spain through different ways (
acquisition, shares, joint ventures, etc ) in about sixty Spanish
companies. Also, it starting to appear Japanese contractors.
Finally, it could be worth to take a look to the personnel structure
in the construction companies. Table 2.6 shows the distribution of
personnel according to the distinction between operating workers
and the rest of employees in construction. On the other hand, table
2.7 shows the education and skill degree having to do with the
quality of human resources in the construction sector.
The main conclusion about Table 2.6 is that the less size of the
company the less overhead and the large portion of qualified
operating workers in comparison with those unskilled and auxiliary
workers. This can be a common characteristic in all countries. The
smaller the companies the higher specialization.
Table 2.6. PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION BY COMPANY SIZE.
% OF TOTAL EMPLOYEES.1986
Total NOT
REMUNERATED PERSONNEL
% REMUNERATED
Employ.Employ. Employ. TOTAL Operating workers
Remuner Employe.
Skilled Unskill. Auxil
< 10 100 21.5 78.5 4.9 69.2 3.9 -
10-20 100 4.7 95.3 10.1 74.3 9.9 0.2
20-49 100 2.0 98.0 9.3 61.4 23.5 1.7
50-99 100 0.8 99.2 11.2 56.0 29.7 0.4
100-199 100 2.4 97.6 11.2 55.8 26.5 2.0
200-499 100 0.0 100.0 18.1 47.9 30.0 0.5
> 500 100.0 0.0 100.0 26.6 36.2 34.5 0.7
TOTAL 100.0 6.7 93.3 14.1 56.0 4.0 0.7
Source : MOPU. Construction Statistics. 1986
Table 2.7. STUDIES LEVEL IN THE CONSTRUCTION SECTOR
IV.90
% OF TOTAL SECTOR EMPLOYEES
STUDIES LEVEL
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
Illiterates 1.5 0.5
w/o studies 13.3 75
Partial Sum 14.8 8.0
Primary Studies 50.1 42.2
a) Secondary Studies 24.6 32.8
a) Professional Formation 7.0 10.8
a) Medium Degrees 2.4 3.1
Partial Sum 34.0 46.7
a) Superior Degrees 1.1 3.1
TOTAL 100.0 100.0
Sum a) 35.1 49.8
Source: EPA.INE.IV 90.
In comparison with the industry on average, the construction sector
has a lack of professionals particularly in secondary studies as well
as medium and superior degrees. This in addition to the amount of
illiterates and lack of elemental studies could be a direct cause of
the low productivity in the sector. It could be very worthy to have
similar statistics for the EC to compare how the personnel structure
in foreign countries. The attention to this component of
competitiveness seems to be very recent in Spain, an arena of
traditional low cost intensive labor.
The cost of the output
The cost structure in the Construction sector can be broken down
as it shown in table 2.8.
Table 2.8. Cost Breakdown in Construction
Cost All firms Large firms ( >500 employees)
ComponentComponent % of total cost % in price % of total cost % in Price
Purchases 36.2 30.4 30.0 26.7
Services 10.2 8.7 12.6 11.2
Subcontracts 27.6 23.2 33.1 29.4
SUB TOTAL 74.0 62.3 75.7 67.3
(1) Labor 26.0 21.8 24.3 21.6
(2) Gross Margin 18.9 15.9 12.5 11.1
TOTAL 118.9 100.0 112.5 100.0
Gross Value 44.9 37.7 36.8 32.7
Added (1) + (2)
Source: MOPU. Construction Structure. 1983-1988
The cost structure is characterized by a high percentage of exterior
purchasing, services and subcontracting in comparison with the gross
value added. Purchases, services and subcontracting represent a 74%
of the costs and 62,3% of the price of the construction company
product while the gross value added is 44,9% and 37,7%
respectively.
Large companies, due to the lack of specialization in relation with
the smaller firms as was seen before, depend more on
subcontracting and their margins are lower.
Other interesting view is the evolution of the cost structure as it
shown in table 2.9.
Table 2.9. EVOLUTION OF THE COST STRUCTURE
Source : Seopan. Master in Construction 1991
Decade of theCost Component 1988. (%)
70's. (%)
Purchases 52.0 36.0
Services 4.0 10.0
Subcontracts 11.0 28.0
Labor 33.0 26.0
Total Cost 100.0 100.0
It can be noted that the subcontracting share of the total cost has
increased as a result of reduction in labor and purchases. The long
crisis suffered by the sector until 1985 gave the change in the
structure of firm tending to a higher level of subcontracting reducing
the amount of own labor and gaining flexibility for the ups and
downs in the market.
Also the weight of the total external overall costs have increased
from 67% in the 70's to 74% in the late 80's. Increasing the
management and coordination needs of the companies. In that way
it can be said that the activity of the construction firms is tending to
get closer to a service industry.
But in all this evolution, what can be said about productivity ?. It's
difficult to get comparable data of production and employment from
a same source. But assuming that there weren't bias in two different
sources, one about output (Seopan) and other about employment
(INE), the evolution of the productivity in the sector can be
developed as it shown in Figure 2.8.
It seems that the moderate improvements in productivity during
the first half of the 80's hasn't had continuity during the second half
of the decade.
Figure 2.8. Evolution of Productivity
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On the other hand prices have experienced a huge increase over
the decade. It can be said the final cost of the construction output
has increased with a factor of 2,1 over the decade. Having the
second half of the decade a factor higher than the first half due to
that in spite of lower increase in prices the productivity has kept
constant if not reducing.
With these data and data presented in tables 1.2 and 1.6 of the
previous chapter it can be said that while the productivity of the
country as a whole has improved, prices grew faster and more
important, the construction industry represents the lowest growth in
productivity and one of the highest growths in the cost of its inputs.
This reveals two important clues. First, construction products get
more expensive in the time relatively to other sectors' products.
Second, promoting public spending in construction during a boom
increases the final cost of them because its prices grow as fast as the
rest of the economy prices or even faster. Nothing to say if the
works are contracted in a hurry, in bad and when the supply is
overloaded of work. Then, the prices paid are huge'.
The role of a Government would not have to be cyclical. That is,
promoting spending during recessions to equilibrate the economy
and leave the main role to private investment during booms. Just
the opposite as it has been in Spain. All we have to do is to see to
all '92 works. Figure 2.10 illustrates these facts.
1 Seopan.Master in Construction.
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The current problems of the sector
The current problems of the sector can be summarized as follows:
- Delay in payments from Public Administrations. At the
beginning of 1992 it was about 0,75 Trillion pesetas. The
causes are : (1) Excessive bureaucracy in legal dealings,
modifications,etc., and (2) Actions from the Treasury to
reduce its cash deficit and (3) Mis-match of Budgets with
works in progress.
- Strong increase in costs of labor and materials having had
an average increase close to 8,5% in 1991.
- High interest rates that worsen the results of companies and
its capacity to give sufficient attention to other aspects of
their activity such as internationalization or R + D.
- Shortage of specialist. Estimated about 75.000 positions.
This fact affects to work quality but furthermore, it also
affects to productivity and competitiveness.
- The official bidding system as was explained earlier in this
chapter.
- Cooling down of the private investment along the last two
years as a result of the high interest rates.
- The cut of government spending in public works and
building construction in the 1992 Budget. With the major '92
works accomplished and the lack of continuity of those, many
companies could have problems, particularly those more
dependent on public bids.
The consequence has been an increase in the average of number
of firms bidding for the same project ( from 5,6 in May 1990 to 12,4
in September 1991 on average ), and a decrease in the average of
maximum negative markups of the projects ( from -11,7% in May
1990 to -29,5% in September 1991 on average ). Its fair enough to
conclude that now in 1992 the supply side of the sector has a surplus
capacity.
Construction Subsectors
There are two subsectors related with construction that act as
suppliers for the construction activities that are : The Cement
Industry, The Concrete Preparing Industry and the Equipment
Vendors.
The booms experienced in construction in the last years has help
to the growth of these subsectors where many changes have taken
place as is described as follows.
The Cement Industry :
The cement production of cement is characterized by high capital
requirements to build plants and to maintain them. Therefore this
industry tends to be concentrated due to the high barriers to entry.
Nevertheless in Spain this characteristic of concentration hasn't
been very usual several years ago. It was normal to see in Spain
cement plants owned by families or small firms where the
technological improvement and updating of them weren't one of
their main strengths. The long recession that the construction sector
suffered until 1985 didn't encourage to the modernization of these
factories.
But now, when the sector has experienced a very important growth
in demand changes have happened. The main structural changes
have been brought by the entry of important foreign group through
acquisitions of several cement plants in Spain. The movement can
be explained by five major reasons :
- The financial difficulty of some firms.
- The lack of modernization in many plants that had
required large investments in new technologies.
- The good prospects of Construction in Spain that could
boost the cement demand.
- The view of Spain as a platform to export cement to
African and American countries.
- An strategy to concentrate the sector eliminating
competitors and gaining bargaining power against
the clients.
In that way Swedish, French and English firms have entered in the
market. Also, they have conducted new technologies, new
organizational schemes as well as large investments in
modernization of plants.
The data about the consumption and production of cement are
shown in Figure 2.10.
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The evolution of the sector has been an steady growth from 1984.
The demand has growth from the level of 16,24 Million Tons in
1984 to 27 Million Tons in 1991. At the same time the national
production hasn't increased in the same proportion due to a very
important fall in the export market. The reasons can be explained
by: (1) Appreciation of peseta, (2) Higher interior inflation rates
and (3) The boom in interior consumption that had to be met. But
it's important to consider that 10% of the national consumption is
imported and has kept steady in the last years if not increasing. The
cement brought to Spain comes mainly from Turkey, Cyprus,
Greece, Romania and Tunisia.
The Concrete Preparing Industry:
Several comments as in the case before can be said. But in this
case the degree of fragmentation is larger. The cost of
transportation reduce the geographical scope of the firms serving to
clients and significant economies of scale can't be reached by size
advantage. Therefore, this subsector is very fragmented.
The situation of this particular industry several years ago was
characterized, again, by being very fragmented and resting on small
family firms with few plants under control where technical
improvements weren't an usual practice.
But few years ago its structural change started tending to
concentrate. Above all foreign firms have been the pushers of this
concentration coming mainly from England, Sweden and France.
The pattern of entry has been through the acquisition of several
quarries and concrete plants in the most populated areas of the
Spanish geography tending to get a dominant position in those
eliminating competitors. The success of this strategy is still to see.
Large amounts have been invested in a moment when the demand
for prepared concrete was boosting. Now some problems are starting
to appear :
- The development or portable plants assembled in site by
construction companies.
- The environmental regulations taking place in Spain. These
tend to avoid the location of plants close to rivers or close to
population centers. Many extra costs are starting to appear
such as extra transportation and land restoration.
- Delays in payments due to the Public Administration has
delays in its payments to Construction Companies that at the
end these are shifted to suppliers.
- Reduction of public works and construction activity in
general that is translated in a higher degree of competition
and lower margins.
In opinion of some experts in the sector, the concrete preparing
industry will suffer a selection process where only the most
competitive and professional ones will survive1.
Figure 2.11 shows the volume of this sector and its important
evolution in the last years.
Figure 2.11. Production of Prepared
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The growth of the production has been huge. In five years the
production has multiplied four times. The next coming years might
be critical for this industry.
The equipment subsector:
This has been other of the successful sectors in these past years.
But again the continuity of such success seems to be threatened by
the path that is taking the economy.
This subsector can be divided in two groups : Heavy equipment
and light equipment. The first group is characterized by being
supplier not only of construction but also of mining activities. It can
be assumed that sales of new equipment for mining remain constant
through the years in comparison with the sales to contractors and
subcontractors that fluctuate more with the business cycle. The
second group can be assumed entirely as construction supplies.
We can take a look to what has been going on to the sale of new
units in the first group described as it shown in Figure 2.11.
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Years 1987 through 1989 were particularly successful for
equipment vendors. In those years sales boosted but 1990 and 1991
offer a different look. In 1990 sales remain growing but the first half
of 1991 presents a negative growth of -23,2% in comparison with the
first half of the preceding year'. The reasons for such spectacular
growth could be explained through the following reasons : (1) The
boom experienced in highway construction and other
Finanzauto. 12/91
infrastructures,and (2) The status of the stock of equipment in Spain
before 1986, old and unproductive, that has needed new
investments.
The new prospects of the construction market have modified the
past trend. From my personal point of view, the growth of sales in
the decade has been too high. In spite of having taken place a
period of very high demand, the number or competitors have
increased spectacularly aimed by such demand. It must be noted
that this is a sector where the barriers to entry are very low. In that
way can be argued that sales have responded to a development of
an overcapacity in the sector that hasn't been very well planned by
the firms. The incoming reduction of the construction output could
be critical for this sector, particularly the heavy equipment.
This last view could be reinforced taking the fact that a large
amount of used units have been acquired and imported from UK,
Holland, Belgium and Germany. Unfortunately, there aren't data
elaborated in such way that could be shown. The analysis of such
flow would leverage the data of figure 2.12 making the growth of the
sector even larger.
Chapter 3.
Analysis of the main construction firms.
As it was described in the previous chapter, the construction
output in Spain is located in 3 large groups : The small size firms,
the medium size and the large firms. But the share of the output by
company size is relatively concentrated primarily between the small
and the largest firms giving to the medium size ones a minor share
of the total output. In a certain way, it can be said that there is a
relative lack of medium size construction companies in Spain.
The analysis of the small companies is a difficult task to carry out
due to the lack of published data and their number that almost
might require individual surveying. Something similar occurs woth
the medium companies. The largest ones offer a very different
character and there are much more published information ( Annual
Reports, Articles, etc ) to carry out an analysis.
In this chapter I will analyze 3 main issues with regard to the
largest companies. These will be : Their production structure, their
financial structure and finally their particular characteristic
regarding to diversification and product lines.
I have chosen a group of nine of the most representative large
construction companies ( >500 employees ) whose list is the
following:
- Dragados y Construcciones.
- Fomento de Obras y Construcciones. (FOCSA).
- Cubiertas y MZOV.
- Agroman.
- Ferrovial.
- Huarte.
- Ocisa.
- Obrascon.
- Laing.
The production structure
The production structure covers the items related with annual
volume, production by employee, sectors suplied ant their share in
the total sales volume, and also the construction abroad.
Table 3.1 shows a first set of characteristics in that direction.
Table 3.1. Annual Sales Volume in Construction and Production by
Employee.1990.
COMPANY SALES Sales/Employee Sales/Permanent
(Million pts) (Million pts) Employ.(Mill pts)
DRAGADOS 259.281 16 30
FOCSA 173.946 9 61
CUBIERTAS 163.000 19 66
AGROMAN 143.711 15 35
FERROVIAL 122.020* 74*
HUARTE 97.803 20 32
OCISA 69.136 21 70
OBRASCON 17.198 20 65
LAING 13.515* 22* 44*
TOTAL 1.059.599 17.75 48
* Data corresponding to 1989.
Source : Annual Reports and Research Associates.
The purpose of this table is to set a first group of distinction
criteria among the different companies. In first place it can be noted
the huge difference in annual volume of sales. Dragados is the sales
leader with 260.000 Million pesetas while Laing with 13.515 Million
pesetas was ranked in 22 nd place in 1989. The following distinction is
about sales per employee. As it can be seen there is a wide range
from 9 Million pts/Employee to 21. This can give a good idea of the
level of subcontracting in each company. The higher the
sales/employee ratio, the higher the level of subcontracting
assuming same productivity in the whole sector. Companies with
higher ratio are consequently more flexible to any downturn in the
market.
Finally, the ratio sales/permanent employee informs about the
company fixed costs and overhead. Dragados, the lider, has the
lowest ratio, meaning that is the company with the highest
overheads in relation with sales.
The second set of characteristics are based on the distribution of
the production among the different clients. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show
it.
Table 3.2. Distribution of Sales in Construction.1990
COMPANY DOMESTIC SALES SALES
CIVIL BUILDING OTHERS ABROAD TOTAL
DRAGADOS 45.41 31.67 16.31 6.91 100.00
FOCSA 65.4 34.6 - - 100.00
CUBIERTAS 56.2 39.1 4.7 1.6 100.00
AGROMAN 50.9 49,1 - - 100.00
FERROVIAL 62.3* 30.7* - 7.0 100.00
HUARTE 37.9 56.9 - 5.2 100.00
OCISA 49.9 50.1 - - 100.00
OBRASCON NA N.A NA 100.00
LAING 53,8 46,2 100.00
Data corresponding to 1989.
Source : Annual Report and Research Associates.
Table 3.3. Distribution of Sales in Construction by type of
Client.1990. Domestic Sales.( %)
COMPANY PRIVATE SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR
DRAGADOS 24 76
FOCSA 21,6 78,4
CUBIERTAS 20,0 80,0
AGROMAN -
FERROVIAL 33 67
HUARTE 35 65
OCISA 35 65
OBRASCON
LAING 34 66
Source: Annual Reports.
Looking at tables 3.2 and 3.3, it can be noted the following
characteristic in the large Spanish construction firms :
- Heavy dependence on the public sector. Their size allows
them to bid in large projects, particularly the large
infrastructure projects.
- Strong specialization in Civil Works by the same reason
pointed out above.
- Minimum international construction that at the end is
translated into a lack of experience in international
construction market. Only the largest companies have a
significant protion of thier sales abroad; but none of them
higher than 7%. The high interior demand existing in Spain
during the last years might have been a good reason to not
paying much attention to projects abroad. This lack of
internationalization could be a key determinant in the EC
context. Some companies, the largest ones, are starting to
move across the Spanish borders towards the rest of Europe.
It seems that this movement will be an important success
factor in the future.
The main international markets where these companies
operate are : South American countries, North African
countries and the Middle East. Construction activities in the
EC are almost non existent.
- Lack of penetration in the private sector. Taking into
account that two thirds of the Construction in Spain belong
to the private sector, the sales in the construction companies
should be better allocated. The largest companies are focused
primarily in the public sector. One thing is true, they are
particularly specialized in civil works while there is a large
number of other large and medium companies focused in the
private sector and in building construction. A good allocation
between public and private constracts could be desirable
from the fact that public constracts fluctuate more in the
business cyle. The private sector could offer a more stable
pattern.
The financial structure
The following section is organized in two main subsections. The
first delaing with profitability and the second dialing with financial
situation.
The profitability is analyzed through 3 major ratios ROA ( Return
of assets), ROE ( Return of equity ) and Gross Margin. Table 3.4
give the value of these ratios for the companies chosen as well as an
average for the whole sector.
Table 3.4. PROFITABILITY ANALYSIS. 1990
COMPANY ROA. % ROE. % GROSS MARG
DRAGADOS 4.1 8.7 4.0
FOCSA 3.5 17.9 2.7
CUBIERTAS 3.4 14.61 3.4
AGROMAN 3.0 11.26 3.0
FERROVIAL 0.9 4.3 0.9
HUARTE 3.7 11.4 2.8
OCISA 3.1 11.5 3.6
OBRASCON 6.5 34.1 6.8
LAING 4.1 29.0 3.7
SECTOR AVERAGE 4.2 11.6 4.0
Source : Annual Reports, Research Associates and own calculations.
It can be observed from table 4.3 that the size of a firm is negative
correlated, on avegage, with its profitability. Smaller companies
present the highest ROA abd ROE as well as very good figures for
Gross Margins. In general, among the largest companies the ones
with less sales volume perform better.
On the other hand there are other three important ratios about
the financial situation. These are : The Current Ratio ( Current
Assets to Current Liabilities ), the Financial Leverage and interest
payments as percentage of sales. Table 3.5 shows these figures.
The first idea that can be perceived is that the Current Ratio is
close to one for all the sector on average. On the Current Assets
side of the Balance Sheet this means that companies with higher
Current Ratio have more relative liquidity. Also it gives a good idea
of the problems that companies would have as well as the sector as
a whole, heavy dependent on the Public Sector, if there were a delay
in Accounts Receivable from the Public Administrations. The
situation, if not translated to the account payables side, could be
very dramatic for many companies. The liquidity in the sector is not
its major strengh.
Table 3.5. FINANCIAL SITUATION. 1990
COMPANY CURR. RATIO % LEVERAGE % INTER/SALES %
DRAGADOS 135.8 152.4 2.5
FOCSA 101.8 363.7 0.1
FERROVIAL 109.0 144.5
CUBIERTAS 
- 324,6 0.4
AGROMAN - 277,4 4.0
HUARTE 135.5 202.15 1.6
OCISA 94.3 253.0 3.3
LAING 111.7 659.2 1.1
OBRASCON 112.4 558.8 2.63
SECTAVERAG 115.1 241.7
Source : Annual Reports and Research Associates.
The Financial Leverage is spread over a wide range with an
average of 2,4. The smaller companies have a higher leverage ratio
due to a higher level of subcontracting, in proportion with their
equity, than the largest firms.
The third component is the weight of interest payments on sales.
Table 3.5 showed the gross margin. As can be compared the interest
payments represent for almost all the companies a high portion of
their margins. This makes to Spanish firms particularly weak. Their
net margin is very weakened, on average, by the interest payments.
How is the sector, on average, going to invest in R + D or human
resources formation with such financial charge ?. Undoubtely, these
last years have been particularly successful for the most of the
companies with regard to net profits. This fact has help to a better
financial performance but again, on averge, the weight if financial
charges is still very high. In a more competitive marketplace, where
the margins where very tight, the Spanish firms would have
competitive disadvantages'.
Product lines and patterns of diversification
At this point, four basic models to group the largest Spanish
Constructin Companies can be made : (1) The Pure Construction
Companies, (2) The Vertical Integrated Company, (3) The
Horizontal Integrated Company, and (4) The Vertical and
Horizontal Integrated Company.
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The first model is composed by those companies whose unique
product is the Construction itself. That is, they offer construction but
being focused or not on specific sector of the demand ( Civil Works,
Housing, Commercial, Leisure, Industrial or Renovation and
Maintenance).
The second model would be that composed by the construction
companies vertically integrated back or forwards. Backwards, they
include Engineering and Design as well as the production and
supply of construction materials. Forwards, they include Real State
operations, Urban Services and Facilities Management.
The third model can be described by those areas where a company
can be positioned not having any direct relationship with the
construction industry.
Finally the fourth model is composed by those firms that meet the
second and the third model at the same time.
The pure construction mode is somehow theoretic in Spain for the
large companies. If well some years ago it could be found some
example among the largest companies (e.g. HUARTE and
OBRASCON), nowadays, this is not the case. All large companies
have started a movement towards diversification vertical or
construction related, horizontal or both.
The other three models can offer many examples and the patterns
followd by the individual firms. Table 3.6 illustrates the second
model in relation with the Spanish firms following this path.
I can be deduced that the vertical integration of construction firms
is being developed forwads. Undoubtely, they are tending to push
the construction industry to a "service like" industry. Not only the
construction of facilities and infrastructures but also its operation,
management and maintenance.
Table 3.6. PATTERNS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION
Construction Design & Real Urban Facilities
Company Construct
Materials Engineer. State Sevices Managemt
£JLU 5 Ua
FOCSA
Entrecanale
Ferrovial
Agroman
OCISA
Obrascon
Cubiertas
Huarte
Laing
Source : Annual Reports and Own Analysis.
New particular segments of business are starting to be added to
the parent companies : Real State development, Urban Services (
Waste Disposal, Sewage and Treatment, Traffic Regulation, etc.)
and Facilities Management. This last segment is fair to highlight.
The increasing privatization or concession of toll highways, urban
parkings, water treatment and many others, is not other thing that a
direct consequence of the process of shifting the operation of the
facilities from the public sector to the private sector. Particularly,
S..55
D% A-
those facilities and infrastructures traditionally operated by the
Public Companies.
Each time the requirements, technical sophistication, managerial
capabilities as well as the volumes of investment are increasing
more and more. Therefore, in a context of market economy where
the public companies offer doubtful effectiviness and
competitiveness in comparison with private ones, more dynamic and
competitive, the only way out is to leave the operation and
management of public services and facilities to those more capable.
The process towards privatization of many traditional public
services and public operations as well as their management seems to
be timidly started in Spain. Many of the largest companies have
developed a parallel process to this privatizations and concessions as
a way to integrate its value chain in the whole construction industry
value chain. Each passing year the construction companies tend to
develop more and more activities with the chain but always looking
forward rather than backwards. The main reason that can be argued
in doing so are related with a higher attractiveness in this segments
characterized by :
- Reduced number of competitors.
- Good Knowledge and Relations with the decision maker,
the Public Administration.
- High future growth of the market in these segments.
- More stable segments than the backward segments.
But the main problem in this approach from my point of view is
that tending the main construction firms to become more "service
like" firms, don't they have to give an special attention to human
resources and R+D ?. One thing is true, each activity requires its
own expertise.
The third model, the diversification in industries and products out
of the construction industry value chain in exposed in table 3.7.
The pattern of horizontal diversification seems to be less followed
by the Spanish Construction Fimrs. The largest ones have a very
divesified activities as Dragados, Ferrovial and CONYCON. The
main reason that could explain this lack is that the vertical
integration can be achieved relatively easier due to the higher
degree of links among the firms' value chain. On the other hand the
horizontal integration requires complete different company's
orientation and the possibility of exploiting linkages is almost non
existent.
Table 3.7. PATTERNS OF HORIZONTAL DIVERSIFICATION.
Constructi Agricultu Minin Tourism Manufacturi Distributi Bankin
Company&Company on re g & ng on g
Leisure
Dragados *** *** ***
Ferrovial *** *** *** *** ***
Conycon *** *** ** ***
Source : Annual Reports and own analysis.
The pattern of horizontal divesification seems to be erratic. The
three companies exposed in table 3.7 have only in common the
sector of leisure and tourism due to its relationship with
construction. With regard to the other sectors there aren't
similarities.
Chapter 4.
The Construction in the European Community
In 1957 the Treaty of Rome was signed by the six founders of the
European Community. It was then when the main objective of the
founders was set : The creation of the Common Market. The Treaty
of Rome was articulated in four big supports regarding to the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capitals as a way to
integrate the six individual markets in a single one where the items
mentioned before could move as they move in their respective
national territories.
That was the main objective pursued in 1957. Thirty years after it,
the Single European Act was signed in 1988. Now, instead of six
member countries the number has increased to twelve and the term
Common Market has been substituted by Interior Market. But, in
spite of these changes the four main objectives to pursue remain the
same as before.
The second half of the 80's has been characterized by a new
impulse of the original idea based primarily on the objectives that
haven't been achieved. European institutions have found the double
support of citizens and companies attracted by the higher degree of
dynamism, competitiveness and transparency in the market from
which all of them can get benefits. The substitution of the adjective
Common by Interior obeys aid the formulation of other additional
objectives : Territorial and wealthy equilibrium among the members,
gains of international competitiveness versus US and Japan, increase
the quality of living, and others.
Later than the Treaty of Rome, but parallel, the EMS ( European
Monetary System ) was developed. It first precedent was the system
called " The Snake " introduce in 1971 as a way to stabilize the
exchange rates among the members that at the end this is translated
into a more stable patterns of trade in the Common Market. Under
this system the exchange rates were set bilaterally. Currencies in the
Snake were allowed to deviate only 2,5% between the weakest and
the strongest creating a controlled band of fluctuation. Several
monetary crisis caused primary by the oil crisis of 1973 led to
continuous readjustments and devaluations; The Snake lost its
stability.
The following step was to create a more stable and powerful
system, the EMS. In 1978 West German Chancellor, Helmut
Schmidt proposed the creation of a new, broader EMS. Schmidt had
become deeply concerned by what he perceived to be an
unwillingness on the part of US to take actions to halt the fall in the
dollar and ensure a more stable pattern of international economic
environment. Only a broader European cooperation, Schmidt
believed, could fill this monetary vacuum. Such cooperation might
also protect the mark - which had been risen from DM 2,5/dollar in
1976 to 1.73/dollar in 1978 - from further appreciation.
Given West Germany's heavy dependence on exports, Schmidt
feared that West Germany goods would eventually become too
expensive for foreign customers. In the way of a broader European
cooperation a critical issue emerged : What incentives were required
to encourage the participation of countries with weaker currencies.
Among these incentives were the redistribution of funds within the
Community to favor the development of the less prosperous
countries (ie. Spain). Weaker countries feared being overwhelmed
by the West Germany's export economy and strong currency'.
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I can be said that this system has performed much better although
there are tensions regarding to loss of soberinity by the respective
national governments as well as the EC budget allocations.
With regard to the Construction sector the main objectives as
Interior Market in 1992, the main objectives : Interior Market in
1992, territorial and wealth balance, international competitiveness
and increasing quality of living have and will have a tremendous
impact in the sector, not only in Spain but also in the rest of the
EC.
The interior market in 1992 established the progressive clearing
until the end of 1992 of all physical,technical and fiscal barriers that
impede the free movement of persons, goods, services and capitals
among the member countries. In that way and in direct relationship
with the construction are : The common public bidding procedures
and the common standards and norms for construction materials.
This affects directly to the national character of the construction
sector in each country supporting the movements across the borders
of the construction firms.
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The redistribution and aid in the way of structural funds has to do
with the territorial and wealth balance among the different areas in
the EC, the more and the less developed. In that way, Spain has
been receiving a part of such funds during the last years. The
opening of Eastern Countries particularly East Germany could
brake the arrival of new substantial funds, at least in the short term
that could be deviated to help to such countries'.
A higher degree of international competitiveness could be
achieved working in common R + D projects. In the case of the
construction sector the development of cooperative projects like
BRITE or EUREKA programs among others.
Finally, the increase in the quality of living will be undoubtedly
accompanied by environmental protection opening new
opportunities for construction. It can be cited for example the recent
Directive from the EC that establishes that will be obligated for all
the cities over 25.000 residents a water treatment plant. Other
actions in such way are the creation of norms about environmental
concern in the design of lineal works such as highways or railways.
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In this chapter will address two main items. Firstly, how the
construction demand is allocated in the EC as well as its evolution
and secondly, the supply side. Also I include an analysis of the
movements across the borders by construction companies at the end
of the chapter
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The EC Construction Market
The construction within the EC represented a production volume
about 53.000 Billion pesetas in 1988 occupying the first place in the
industrial sector. Also, it was the first employer with 8,6 Million
employees in 19881.
In 1990 its production reached 65.000 Billion pesetas allocated as
Figure 4.1 shows.
Figure 4.1. Internal Construction
it in the EC. 1990
% total 199
% total EC
1 EC GDP
Consruct
Italy -
France
W.Ger /1any P3/1//zzil/// 9///
0 10 15 20 25
Source: EUROCONSTRUCT and own calculations.
1 ECIF. European Construction Industry Federation.
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The largest markets are formed by W.Germany, France, Italy, UK
and Spain accumulating in them an 87% of the total construction
output. Also it's shown in figure 4.1 the contribution of each country
to the EC total GDP for 1991. The comparison between share in
the whole output and the share in the construction output can give a
good idea of the relative construction intensity in each country.
Taking fir Spain and index of 100, W. Germany would have 78,
France 75, UK 55 and Italy 59. It's not difficult to see that this
relatively large differences are due to the infrastructures program in
Spain, the main works carried out for the '92 main events, Olympics
and World Fair, and the recent boom in commercial construction.
Taking the classification of ECIF the construction output is divided
in two large groups : (1) Building Construction, including
residential and non residential, and (2) Civil Engineering. Figure 4.2
describes the distribution of the European construction output
among the different sectors.
The largest share is for renovation and maintenance works
followed by residential, civil engineering and non residential -
commercial and industrial - building.
104
Figure 4.2. EC Construction Output
distributed by sectors. 1990*
(4%)
% Share of each secIo
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Non resid. Private
Rennovatiorn/Mainten.
Source : Euroconstruct. Dec 1990.
* It doesn't include : Luxembourg, Greece and Portugal.
An interesting view can be given by the share of these specialties
in each EC member as figure 4.3a and b show. The main points to
highlight from these figures are the high share of renovation and
maintenance in all the countries with the exception of Spain and
Belgium whose share is just the half of the EC average. Also, the
big share of civil engineering works in the case of Spain - 33% of
the total construction output in Spain - while the EC average was
21% in 1990. One of the main reasons for this lack of renovation
attention in Spain could be explained through its relative lack of
infrastructures and social equipment in comparison with the EC
average. This comparison would even be more dramatic taking only
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the 5 most developed countries of the EC as will be shown in the
next chapter.
UK Italy
sector
Residen
Non ra
Non resi
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Country
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Source : Euroconstruct and Seopan. (It doesn't include Portugal, Greece and Luxembourg).
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Figure 4.3 a. Construction Output
S Distribution by sectors in each country. 1990*
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France and Germany also have a very important activity in Civil
Engineering - just after renovation - coincident with developments in
infrastructure networks.
Residential construction is particularly important in Belgium, Italy
and Ireland being the most important construction sectors in these
countries with the exception of Italy where renovation accounts for
the largest share.
Non residential construction seems to be very important in all the
countries, particularly the private one in UK, Belgium, Ireland and
Spain.
Following this description of the EC construction market, it could
be interesting to take a look to the evolution of the sector over the
last decade as sell as its recent developments.
The first half of the 80's was characterized by a low GDP growth
and a progressive declining in the construction activity until 1985.
From 1986 to 1990 this trend changed giving pass to other business
cycle with higher rates of growth in GDP and positive growth rates
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in Construction output. The evolution of Spain matches perfectly in
this context but with a particular characteristic. The construction
real growth and declining are amplified in some way in the case of
Spain if we compare it to the average.
Figure 4.4. Real Growth in GDP and in
Indexi 3  Construction Output in the EC.
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Source : Financial Times 11/18/91 : European Commission and EICF.
1991* Estimate; 1992* Forecast.
The beginning of the new decade has brought with it the end of
the expansive wave of the business cycle. 1991 represents the first
year with negative growth for construction in the EC while Spain
has still had positive growth in construction - around 4% -. It seems
that the boom is over.
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In spite of the positive balance of growth over the decade of the
80's the real growth in construction achieved in the different
countries is spread over a side range as figure 4.5 illustrates.
Figure 4.5. Real Growth in Construction
in the different countries. 1981-1991
Country
Ireland
Denmark -
Portugal -
Netherl -
France -
Belgium -
Spain -
UK -
Italy -
W. Germany -
-0 -0 -20
Source: ECIF and own calculations.
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But the most important is that during the first half of the 80's the
contraction was general but in the case of Denmark, W.Germany
and UK - 4,8%, 0% and 0% growth respectively -. Also, the reverse
is true. In the second half of the 80's with Denmark again, the
exception. Therefore, with the EFIC forecast for 1992, a contraction
109
t
in the construction output of -0,4%, not very bright years can be
expected in the next future for the sector in the whole EC.
On the other hand, it could be interesting to take a look to the
evolution of the different construction demand sectors during the
80's to what activities have acted pulling the construction recovery.
Figure 4.6 shows this evolution.
Figure 4.6. Evolution of the Main
Construction Demand Sectors. ( Real growth)
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The pulls of the construction in the EC have been civil engineering
and the private commercial-industrial construction. Residential has
been declining over the years in comparison with the general trend
and public commercial-industrial construction also has kept below
the general trend.
Within the residential segment the most important clue is that new
housing construction has declined during the last years while
renovation and maintenance has kept growing. The total balance in
the segment, though declining versus the total construction in
general, is still successful for renovation works according to ECIF.
The annual average growth in the residential sector has been 2,2%
over the second half of the 80's, the lowest of all sectors.
Commercial-Industrial construction has been one of the most
dynamic segments. Particularly in its private part where has been
growing at an annual average of 5,7 during the second half of the
80's. This growth can be explained by a a bright private investment
process that is cooling down at the end of the 80's as a response to
the tight monetary policies applied in the EC countries such as
Spain.
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Civil engineering has been other of the star sectors in construction
during the last half of the 80's. This segment has been pushed by
the activity in some countries as Spain, Portugal, France, UK and
W.Germany developing programs in transportation infrastructures.
The average growth in the second half of the 80's has been around
6,7% per year. Now this rate of growth seems to be declining as a
result of cuts in infrastructures investment as the case of Spain.
The balance for the total construction output in the second half of
the 80's in a annual average growth of 4,8% in real terms that
presents a declining in 1991 in the sector as a whole.
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The Supply Structure
As it was done in the previous chapter with the single case of
Spain I will address in this point the same issue about the structure
of the supply in construction, that is, the construction firms. But now
I will take a broader scope. This analysis will be based on the
internal construction in the five largest construction markets in the
EC. These are W. Germany, France, Italy, UK and Spain accounting
among them for an 87% of the total internal construction in the EC
(1991).
Undoubtedly, the size of this area justifies that it will be in it
where the highest number of companies can be allocated giving a
secondary importance to the companies of the rest of the EC
members.
Earlier in this thesis the particular characteristics of the
construction activity were described. Its fragmentation can be
explained through those characteristics but also adding other
additional ones':
1 Porter.1980. Chapter 9.
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- Low entry barriers. No huge requirements of capital
investment is needed to become a contractor.
- Absence of significant economies of scale or learning
curves. The best example is in figure 2.8. The improvements
in productivity aren't very high.
- Close local control and supervision of the activity as well as
the need for local image and local contacts with suppliers,
clients. That is a good knowledge of the local construction
value adding chain.
- Different requirements, regulations and standards in the
product by geographic areas.
- Exit barriers. Difficult possibility to access to other markets
during a downturn in the construction market. In other
words, a professional constraint difficult to avoid to enter in
other industries.
This makes the construction industry very fragmented as well as
very competitive. Therefore, a similar pattern of fragmentation can
be expected across the countries. Nevertheless we will see some
substantial differences.
114
Following this path of thinking I will analyze the structure of the
supply for the five largest construction markets in the EC. The
comparison will highlight the main differences among these
countries and their particular characteristics.
Firstly in could be worthwhile to see the distribution of the
construction output by company size, that is, the number of
employees as figure 4.7 shows.
Figure 4.7. Share in each country output
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Source : Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics for Europe. ONU.1990.
* Data for Spain. MOPU (1988); Data for Italy. Ecosfera (1990).
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From figure 4.7 can be noted that Italy is the country where the
small companies (1-20 employees) are the more predominant in
comparison with the rest of the firms. Italian small firms have a
66% of share in the output. Following a similar pattern like Italy,
France and Spain have a 45,33% and 47% respectively of the
construction output by small companies. The other extremes are UK
and W.Germany where the small firms have only a 33% and 28,6 %
respectively.
The medium size companies ( 20-200 employees) seem to be the
most important sector in W,Germany with a share of 52% in the
total German output. France and UK have similar patterns being
the share in the construction output for these companies around
30% in both. Spain and Italy represent the other extreme with a
23% and 22% respectively.
The large size firm is the most important sector in the UK with a
38% percent share in the total UK construction output. Spain
follows a similar pattern with 30%. W.Germany and France have an
intermediate position with 21% and 25% respectively. Italy is the
extreme with a 12% of the output by large firms.
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The previous description gives a good idea of the power of the
different sizes of firms in the output of each county and also a firms
overview of the fragmentation in each country. In this way can be
said that there are different patterns of fragmentation in these five
countries if we compare each other.
The Spanish market is polarized to small and large size companies,
having the medium size ones a relative lower importance. The
Italian market is polarized to the small and medium size companies
with an stronger presence of the former. The German market is
primarily characterized by the power of the medium size companies,
the sector that has the highest presence giving less importance to
the rest. France seems to be the country with a smoother
distribution relative of its neighbors although as will be seen later
presents its particular characteristics. Finally UK output is polarized
to large size firms being it degree of fragmentation lower that in the
rest of the countries.
The number of companies in each country also can give a good
idea of the competition in each market as well as the fragmentation.
Data in figure 4.8 show the number of construction firms in each
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country as e\well as the average size of the companies in terms of
number of employees. The range of differences seems to be huge.
40 From 16.6% employees/firms on average in the case of W.Germany
to 4,24 employees/firm in the case of UK
Figure 4.8. Number of Construction Firms
and Average size. 1988
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What can explain these differences. Several reasons can be
argued. A high number of employees per firm can obey to : (1) Low
amount of subcontracted works ( and the lack of firms'
specialization derived form it ), and (2) High percentage of small
companies in the total number of firms. But a more interesting view
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can be extracted form table 4.1. First it can be seen the huge
number of small companies in France and UK, similar situation
happens in Italy in spite of not being shown in the table. This
implies for these countries a higher amount of subcontracted work
than in the other two, W.Germany and Spain, as a result of a higher
specialization of the small firm.
Table 4.1. NUMBER OF COMPANIES BY SIZE AND #
EMPLOYEES/FIRM. 1988.
Country % of EC 0-19 employees 20-199 employees > 200 employees
Construction # firms #empl/firm # firms #empl/firm # firms #empl/firm
Spain 11 62710 4.94 2618 47.3 115 878.9
W.Germ 27 49238 6.62 10000 49.1 439 405.5
France 23 309479 2.1 10755 42.1 413 675.5
UK 13 176028 1.42 5570 46.8 420 619.0
Source: Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics(ONU .1990), EUROCONSTRUCT,
MOPU and own calculations.
But what about the medium and large companies ?. On one hand
German and French markets have similar size - 27% and 21 % of
the EC construction market respectively - but the number of
medium size companies is higher in France being a more
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competitive market for medium size companies. On the other hand
particular attention must be addressed to Spain that having a
market approximately the half of the French one, has only a fourth
of the number of medium size companies that France has although
the size of the companies is larger ( # employees ) in the case of
Spain. K presents a more adjusted pattern to France and Germany
according to its market size.
Larger companies are not very usual in Spain and their size is
larger, on average, than in the rest of the countries. This gives to
large Spanish firms a lack of flexibility in comparison with their
close competitors. The gain in flexibility is justified through a higher
percent of subcontracted work. UK presents a powerful number of
large companies in comparison with the volume of its market.
France and Germany present similar figures for large companies
although, on average, the French company is larger than the
German.
If we compare the Spanish firms with the rest of the countries'
firms, taking into account that the Spanish market is mainly focused
on small and large size firms and the size of the Spanish
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construction market, there is no doubt about the following
characteristics:
- Spain lacks of medium and large size companies.
- Less competitive marketplace for medium and large
companies.
- Less amount of subcontracted work due to a larger size of
the companies on average if we compare them to their
counterparts in the EC. Therefore, Spanish firms lack of
flexibility to cope with downturns in the market.
- Also a lower rate of innovation and technological
development can be expected in Spanish construction firms
because of the relative lack of competition in the market.
To set a more accurate comparison and to highlight the ideas
exposed before, we can compare two indexes among the different
countries. First the market size and second, the number of medium
a large companies to finish giving an idea of the level of competition
in each market.
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Small companies are not taken into account because they have a
very local scope and it is not likely that one small firm could
compete with other in its same geographical area. This is not the
case of the medium and large companies whose geographical scope
can be local, regional, national, or even international.
The results from Table 4.2 highlight one of the most important
Table 4.2. COMPETITION INDEX FOR LARGE AND MEDIUM
COMPANIES IN THE DIFFERENT COUNTRIES
COUNTRY Market Size Index # of medium and large Competition
firms index (fragmentation) Index
W. Germany 100.0 100.0 100.0
France 77.7 107.0 137.7
UK 48.1 57.3 119.1
Spain 40.7 26.2 64.1
Source : Own analysis from Data on table 4.1.
conclusions mentioned before: the lack of competitiveness in the
Spanish marketplace. The index obtained for Spain is less than half
than in France, approximately half of the United Kingdom's and one
third less than the West Germany's. What is the least fragmented
marketplace from the medium and large companies point of view?
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Undoubtedly, the Spanish market. The Italian market has not been
analyzed due to a lack of data but its pattern of competitiveness
could be assimilated to France with a high importance of small and
medium size companies. Going towards an integration, The Spanish
firms are those who are going to suffer from a higher competition by
foreign firms as will be in more depth analyzed in the fifth chapter.
On the other hand, UK and French markets are more difficult to
invade. The German market offers an intermediate position but
much stronger than the Spanish one.
Also we should not forget that these countries have a more
developed technological status with a larger spillover on the other
sectors of the economy, therefore reaching also to the construction
industry.
Hence, it is not strange that with the ideas exposed before we can
find in countries like Italy, France, West Germany, and UK, higher
values of productivity per worker, a more intensive use of
equipment, and a higher degree of internationalization1 .
1 Fco. Javier Fernandez. Strategies Available to Spanish Costruction and Engineering Firms in order
to Compete in the New Emerging European Market". MIT Master Thesis 1991.
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The lack of internationalization can be one of the most expensive
bills that the European Market can pass to the Spanish Construction
firms given the limited experience they have abroad. Figure 4.9
illustrates this fact.
Figure 4.9. Overseas Earnings of
top 250 International Contractors. 1984
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Assuming that the construction abroad made by Spanish firms in
1990 was $ 0,45 Billion and this figure is around the 50% of the
value achieved in 1984, the construction by Spanish firms abroad
represented $ 0,9 US Billion in 1984, very far away from the
amounts included in Figure 4.9, where only the top 250 international
contractors are included.
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As it can be seen, French firms are the most active international
constructors in the EC followed by UK, Germany and Italy. The
reasons for such internationalization will be argued in Chapter 5.
Unfortunately, Spanish firms do not have the same international
projection.
Finally, Table 4.3 collects the ideas exposed before trying to
summarize the relative comparison among the countries analyzed.
Table 4.3. SUMMARIZED COMPARISON AMONG THE
DIFFERENT COUNTRIES.
Relative Market International Subcontracting Company size relativelyCountry
Fragmentation. Involvement Level more frequent
Spain Low Poor Moderate Small
W.Germany Moderate Moder-High Moderate Medium
France High High High Medium
Italy High High High Medium
UK High High High Large
Source : Own analysis.
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Movements across the borders
The incoming opening of the European Interior Market seems to
be encourage agreements and operations across the borders among
firms of different nationalities. These firms are not only from EC
countries but also from abroad as US and Japan.
The process undertook by some firms trying to expand their
geographical operations seems to be very related with a general
trend of globalization highly developed in many sectors of the
industry. The construction industry is one of these cases. But if this
trend is true without considering the future changes in the EC
beyond 1992, a higher degree of movements across the borders can
be expected if we count on that. The following chapter will deal
with these circumstances with more depth. But now, I will focus in
the facts rather than in the causes or objectives of these movements
across the borders.
It can be interesting to start with it two steps. First, to see the
trend and second, to see the participants involved.
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Table 4.4 shows the mergers and acquisitions trends in the EC
from 1984 through 1988 including international operations between
Community and Non- Community enterprises.
Table 4.4. MERGERS TRENDS IN THE COMMUNITY.
1984- 1988
Total mergers and acquisitions of Mergers and acquisitions of majority
majority holdings involving at least one holdings where the combined turnover of
SECTOR of the 1000 largest firms in the EC the firms involved exceeded ECU 1000SECTOR
Million
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88
Food 34 52 51 17 35 40
Chemical 57 71 85 33 51 57
Metal 17 19 40 4 11 32
Construct. 14 19 33 8 11 29
Source : Data gathered by European Commission in the specialist press.
As it is revealed in table 4.4 construction has been a very active
sector in these transnational movements with a growing rate of
mergers through the second half of the eighties. Particularly
important is also that the most of the mergers are done between the
large companies if we compare the two main columns of table 4.4.
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Therefore construction seems to be moving through the
globalization of its operations in a lower degree than other sectors.
There are more firms in construction than in other sectors because
is a more fragmented industry, but on the other hand the degree of
mobility is lower. This fact could explain the differences among
sectors in the figures exposed.
Within the construction sector a second step can be given going to
see the main participants in the cross-border mergers and
acquisitions in Europe. Table 4.4 is organized by company and its
nationality showing the holdings in construction related firms or
agreements undertook.
Table 4.4. CROSS BORDER HOLDINGS
Company and Nationality Stake in Country Stake/Agreement
France
Bouygues Losinger Czchechoslovakia 85%
Fercaber Spain 70%
Dragados Spain 5%
CGE In negotiation Spain In negotiation
Norwest Hoist UK 100%
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Table 4.4 Continued.
Company and Nationality Stake in Country Stake/Agreement
France
Dumez CFE Belgium 34%
McAlpine UK 12%
Hans Brochier W. Germany 25%
Dumez-Copisa Spain 100%
GMT Entrepose In Negotiation Spain In negotiation
Fougerolle Maurice Delens Netherlands 40%
Jean Lefebre P. Bituminosos S.A. Spain > 50%
United Kingdom
Balfour Beatty In Negotiation Spain In Negotiation
J. Mowlen Const. Desmontables Spain >50%
AMEC Kittleberger W. Germany 50%
Serete France 20%
Joint venture
Holzmann and Jotsa W-Germany-Spain
Agreement in Spain
Germany
Bilfinger Birse UK 15%
Phillip Holzmann Ed Ast Austria -
Hillen & Roosen Netherlands 100%
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Table 4.4 Continued.
Company and Nationality Stake in Country Stake/Agreement
Germany
Phillip Holzmann Jotsa Spain 50%
Nord France France 100%
Tilbury Douglas UK 20%
Hochtief Guaranti-Insaat Italy 42%
Hugo Durst Austria 100%
Ferrovial Spain Joint Venture
Italy
Lodigliani O. Hidraulicas y V. Spain >50%
Italstrade Const. Solins Spain >50%
Spain
Cubiertas+ Entrecanales Lilley UK 21,5%
Dragados Van Oort Netherlands Joint Venture.Dravo.
Polar Finland Joint Venture. Spain
HASA HAKA Finland Venture Agreement
*OCISA SAE France 15,5%
OSHA SAE France J. Venture.OSHAE
* Operation canceled lately.
Source: Data gathered from Salomon Brothers ( Financial Times, several articles,1991),
CONSTRUMAT ( March 1990 ) and Actualidad Economica.
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Data in table 4.4 are quite relevant. From de 33 cases listed (
Ocisa's case is not accounted ), thirteen cases have made spot in
Spain while the rest are spread over other countries.
Table 4.5. Number of Cross Border Holding Operations
by country reached
COUNTRY #
Spain 13
W. Germany 2
France 3
Czchechoslovakia 1
UK 4
Belgium 1
Netherlands 3
Austria 2
Italy 1
Finland 2
TOTAL 33
Source: Own elaboration from data in Table 4.4
On the other hand the most active firms come from France and
Germany with 12 and 9 operations respectively. French companies
seem to have special attention to the Spanish firms ( 50% of their
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transactions ) while W. German firms address their transactions in a
more disperse way.
Table 4.6. Number of countries reached by nationality of firms
COUNTRY #
France 6
UK 3
W. Germany 6
Spain 4
Italy 2
Source : Own elaboration from data in table 4.4.
The number of countries reached for each country's firms is higher
for W. Germany and France while lower for UK, Spain and Italy.
Therefore, acquiring positions in other countries is more aggressively
undertook for French and German Firms than for the rest. In spite
of reaching 4 countries, Spanish firms have undertaken joint venture
agreements in the most of the cases rather than acquisitions or
major stock. On the other hand their counterparts have pursued a
more aggressive approach through stake positioning. It seems that
the size, financial capabilities or management attention to these
trends are very weak in the Spanish firms.
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Finally and given that the most of the transactions are undertaken
by the large construction european groups, it can be worthwhile to
look at the size of the major construction companies in each country
to get some ideas of their major differences.
Figure 4.10. Turnover of the Main European
Construction Firms. 1989
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Source ; Data gathered from several sources.
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The comparison among the large companies as figure 4.10 shows
the following differences :
- French companies have a larger volume of sales and some
of them are true giants as CGE, Dumez and Bouygues.
- French and UK companies are more diversified to other
activities while German and Spanish firms are not very
diversified.
- The largest Spanish firms are smaller than the rest of their
competitors and have a lack of diversification. German and
UK firms present a position in the middle of this context.
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Chapter 5.
PROSPECTS FOR THE SPANISH CONSTRUCTION
It's certainly difficult to assess a forecast about the economic
activity of a country. This is particularly true when the character of
the economic evolution presents some signs of change. Forecasting
the continuity of a given trend can be an easy task from the
available data. In a different way, the start of a recession or the
recovery from it have a good deal of difficulty and it's very likely to
make wrong conclusions.
Nevertheless, there are some ideas, situations and facts that can't
escape from our consideration and give us certain clues of great
importance for the task of assessing a forecast with limited chance
for error.
If all the exposed above is certainly true for the economy as a
whole, then, the construction sector, whose cycles are delayed and
amplified in comparison with the general economy ones, presents an
even higher degree of difficulty and uncertainty to evaluate its
evolution in the future. But again, there are some points that can let
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us clues about its evolution as will be described in this chapter.
This Chapter is divided in two major sections. The fist one deals
with the short run. The second does with the megium-long run. The
reason for such distinction is justified by their different character.
The short run is influenced by the current situation of the Spanish
economy, that is, the unbalances described in Chapter 1 such as
inflation, exterior deficit and other structural problems. On the
other hand, the long run is affected by other set of factors that deal
with growth and development of the country. In my own opinion
these factors require special attention due to its importance with
regard to the membership of Spain in the Interior European
Market.
The objective is to set some clues that can clarify the evolution of
the Spanish construction as well as the needs for it to contribute to
the country's growth and welfare to which undoubtely is joined.
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The short run
In this section I will describe the current economic situation
addressing the main points and the solutions exposed and
recommended from several institutions that in one way or other
agree in the same points'.
In a second step the construction sector will be addressed from
two prospectives : (1) Investment and (2) construction firms.
The economy's situation :
As was described in Chapter 1, the Spanish economy is siffuring
from two major unbalances. On the one hand, the exterior deficit in
its current account. On the other hand, a high rate of inflation and a
questionable high unemployment rate.
With regard to the first point, the current account deficit, the are
some ideas to remark. The ariticle about Spain published in The
1 I will highlight the main ideas from a survey of Spain published in The Economist ( 15/4/92) titled
"After the Fiesta " and other articles included in ECONOMISTAS. 1991
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Economist doesn't talk very much about it. It highlights the large
deficit that ended in 1991 being very close to 3% of the GDP. But
more important is its trend with five consecutive years growing. The
financing of this deficit only has been possible through the large
capital inflow from foreing countries in these last years.
Is the Spanish economy losing competitiveness ?. The answer is
not clear. According to J.L. Feito I exports have been increasing in
the last years. But this is not good enough when imports have also
increased faster than exports resulting in a growing current account
deficit. This author considers that the foreing capital inflow has
been the direct responsible of this deficit through the acquisition of
real assets. But he recognizes some step back in competitiveness
that is very small if we consider the capital inflow as the main
responsible.
Also Mr. Feito argues that the capital inflow, attracted by higher
rates of return, has pushed the peseta to the top of the band of the
EMU. This situation and also the higher inflation in Spain relatively
11 ECONOMISTAS. Number 50. Sept 1991. J.L. Feito. " Reflexions about the international
competitiveness of the Spanish economy and the peseta exchange rate".
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to its trade partners have damaged the competitiveness. But again,
he considers it a minimal effect in comparison with the huge capital
inflow.
The Economist offers a different explanation that deals with the
loss of competitiveness. It points out four ideas ; (1) The low
country's spending on R + D - still under 1% of GDP - that is lower
than the richer EC countries, (2) The increasing labor costs faster
than EC competitors, (3) Efficiency has to be improved and (4) The
bargaining power of Unions that makes the labor market very rigid -
still with an official 15% unemployment rate that seems incredible.
The facts have been exposed along this thesis. Now it's a good
time to see some of the solutions proposed. The Economist argues
about the continuing current account deficit and its amount. All this,
along with the loss of competitiveness, could make foreigners to lose
confidence. Same point is argued by Mr. Feito.
Mr. Feito comments two possible ways out. The first is that if
foreigners lose confidence then it would be necessary to increase
interest rates with a restrictive monetary policy to offset the
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expected foreign exhange risk of a devaluation. The second solution
could be a devaluation of the preseta within the band allowed by
the EMU or renegotiation of the central exchange rates. This last
solution, in his opinion, would generate a new inflation spiral
although it would work in a very short term. This is true for two
reasons : (1) The real unemployment rate in Spain is much lower
than the official figure and (2) Import prices would increase.
Therefore, this second solution would lead to a similar situation but
delayed and it would be necessary a more drastic measure in the
future to cure that situation.
On the other hand, the first solution seems better than the second.
But rising the interest rate can conduce to investment crowding out.
The cure is painful but maybe the most popular. From my personal
view, there are other means to achieve it but these other ways are
less popular.
The Economist highlights some issues in that direction connecting
directly with my second point, inflation and unemployment.
Chapter 1 showed that inflation was not caused by a cost rising but
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a demand higher than the supply. That is a demand inflation. This
shows some sort of contradiction with the high official
unemployment rate close to 15%. This inflactionary process can be
explained through some of the issues argued in The Economist :
The Unions power, the unemployment fraud and the black economy.
But other two things are also pointed out in this article ; The
excessive and unefficient bureaucracy in the administration and the
daily corrupcion scandals that appear in the press. All these
problems are suggesting the need for drastic reforms in the Public
Administrations, relations with Unions and spending control in
subsidies to public-owned companies and unemployment benefits,
and others.
These measures are also in direct relationship with the Maastrich
rules that Spain needs to meet. But the need for such reforms are
not only the result of meeting the EMU requirements but also the
realistic reforms that an economy that wants to grow and achieve
higher levels of health and welfare has to pursue. That is, no matter
the conditions imposed by the Maastrich Agreements because if
these were non existent, the problems to solve and the reforms to
undertake would be indentical.
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In the own words of the Spain's Finance Minister, Mr. Carlos
Solchaga, : " The lesson of 1991 - furthermore, of all our economy in
the past - is that prosperity demands sacrificies. But it's necessary to
eliminate the link that is tried to set between the European
Monetary Union and the induced recession in the economy. It would
be necessary to make remember to those interested in that
association that not converging to Europe wouldn't get us free of the
effort and sacrificies that now they anticipate and fear, though, it
wouldn't allow us our historic objective of being a part of the
construction of the Europe of the next century..."' .
Investment :
It has been quite remarkable the investment process in Spain
during the last half of the 80's. Nowadays this process presents a
different look because of the major economy's unbalances that have
imposed its cooling down.
1 ECONOMISTAS. Number 52. 1991. " Spain 1991. A balance ". Carlos Solchaga's article. " 1991
; The lessons of a suppossed mediocrity".
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The parameter that measures the amount of investment through a
period is GFCF that includes : (1) Private Investment, (2)
Residential Investment and (3) Non Residential Public Investment.
Undoubtely, the most important component of GFCF is the first
one, private investment, with a share between 60 and 70% of the
whole GFCF in the case of Spain1.
The rates of growth of GFCF presented extraordinary figures
being 14,2% in 1988 or 13,2% in 1989 - both in real terms - and
pushing the economy's growth. This investment has been promoted
from both sides, private and public sector. The Spanish government
initiated an expansionary fiscal policy primarily through the
infrastructure investment program.
This process has been also encouraged from the private side due
to the political and social stability of the country after the
establishment of the democracy. Now there isn't any reason to doubt
about this stability. The economic growth over the last decade has
brought better time for companies that have been able in the most
11 Revista de Economia. Number 9. 1991. Carmen Lopez Pueyo. "The recovery of
investment in Spain and its continuity ".
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of the case to generate profits enough to offset a large portion of
their financial charges as well as to increae its reserves to reinvest in
new business opportunities. This has also been the case of
construction firms.
Public spending on infrastructures has been also remarkable with
the most brilliant achievements looking at 1992. There is no
question about its role in promoting growth. But other different
questions that can be made are : whether this program has been
correctly administered and whether it has been too much for the
supply side of the economy. Private and public sectors have been
pushing the demand at the same time.
Inflation has appeared in this scenario as the major factor
responsible of the investment slowdown. The GFCF growth was only
3,4% in 1991 - very far from those years when it reached up to
14,6% (1987) -. Wages and financing charges have grown very fast.
In the same article mentioned before, "After the Fiesta", these two
facts are mentioned. It also collects the CEOE' feeling about the
11 CEOE. Spanish Employers's Confederation.
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infrastructure needs of Spain - still far from the EC average as will
be analyzed later on this chapter -. The trouble is that the happy-go-
spending days are over. Growth is slower, the bills for the recent
binge are comming in, the Maastrich rules require a new prudence.
And all this while Spanish businesses are struggling to adjust to the
blast of the EC-wide competition.
What does all this mean for the construction sector ?. Construction
has a large share in GFCF, therefore, the slowdown in investment
has to affect to this sector as in fact is happening.
The construction sector in the short-run :
Construction is facing two major cuts from the demand side:
- The cut in offcial bidding. The amounts of works in public
bidding have reduce over 54% - in constant pesetas - during
the first quarter of 1992 in comparison with the same period
in 1991.
- The cooling down in private investment. This sector
primarily covers residential, commercial and industrial works.
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Real State market is seeing how the happy days are over.
Now interest rates are higher, demand for real State has
decreased considerably and prices are coming down. Margins
are squeezing. Furthermore, according to some experts, the
worst in Real State sector is still to come'.
If we add to this situation the real situation in which the major
projects for 1992 are about or even over and don't have continuity,
the result for the supply side or the sector can be predictable.
The private sector is cooling down. The public sector has financing
problems to meet its payments. And competition is construction is
increasing. Also we have to consider that inflation in this sector is
about 10% in comparison with the whole economy's inflation of
6,6%.
The short-term prospects for the sector guess difficult times. The
surplus capacity built by construction firms in the second half of the
80's could be more than big enough to satisfy the current demand.
Statistics for bankrupcies and payment dafaults are now increasing
1 Expansion. 3/18/1992.Expansion. 3/18/1992.
146
in comparison with those good years - not only in construction, but
also in other sectors of industry and services -1.
The selection process has already started and only those firms
better prepared could ride the downturn. The companies that can
successfully get out of a recession are those who have strong points
in:
- Low fixed cost base. Company with flexible structures and
higher levels of subcontracting are better equipped to face a
downturn that those with high overheads and large
laborforce.
- High exposure of the bottom line to diversification.
- Net debt/cash position. In the context of delayed payments
from public authorities disrupting cashflow, financial strength
becomes an issue of increasing importance.
I would also add other important issue.Those firms less dependent
on the public sector are better positioned than those whose main
clients portfolio is focused on public institutions. Situation that is
very common is many Spanish construction firms. In this same line
1 INE. " Statistiscs of payment defaults and bankrupcies ". September 1991.
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of thinking, international markets can be a very good way out for
those companies that already have positions abroad.
But two more questions are remaining. How big and how long may
the recession be ?. There are many opinions about it. Several
experts argue that 1992 will be the first year that construction will
present a negative growth about -2% or even more. Mr. Antonio
Duran, President of Dragados y Construcctiones,S.A, thinks so
although he believes that 1993 will be a year of a timid recovery and
the start point of a new growth cycle. This cycle will be aimed by
the new programs in transportation infrastructures and residential
construction1. Nevertheless, this growth is not expected to be as
high as it has been in the period 1985-1990. An annual average
growth rate about 5% is expected.
Following the same arguments, Seopan and Ancop, the Spanish
contractor's association, believe that the current situation of the
Spanish construction won't improve until 1995 - being also 1993 the
first year showing some signs of recovery -. Both have confidence in
the Spain's infrastructure deficit in comparison with the EC average.
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1 ABC. Economy Journal. 6/1/1992.
The two opinions collected in this section rely on the role of the
Public Administration as the main responsible to help to the sector
through new infrastructure and housing programs. Also, they both
argue that these investments will be the main factors to promote
growth in Spain. In my opinion, there are also other factors that
help to promote growth. Creation of jobs and capital accumulation
are basic growth factors. But there is a third factor responsible for
growth. This factor is the technological progress - called Total
Factor Productivity Growth in Solow's model - that, for example,
accounts for the main growth factor in USA - as much as capital
and labor together. Therefore, saying that the infrastructure deficit
in Spain will act as something impeding growth is not a dogmatic
true. There is a wide field to act and to promote growth whose
effect is certainly more powerful. That is, technological and human
capital development.
This third factor can be considered essential to become
competitive in the international markets and is a critical issue to rise
the living standards in the country.
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The medium and the long run
The future growth of Spain depends in whole or in a large part on
the factors that are limiting it. These factors can be summarized as
follows:
- There are some reforms urgently needed from the Public
Administration as was described in previuos sections. These
reforms, if not undertaken, will act delaying the Spanish
growth. The development of higher healthy levels only can be
achieved with a proper administration of the economy's
resources. These reforms are spread over a wide range. From
the Public Administration itself to public-owned companies
but always looking for eliminating the 'structural rigidities'.
Spending control is the main measure recommended by
OECD and IMF to Spain.
- In the most of the cases public owned companies operating
in the industrial and services sectors present negative results
systematically. Subsidies from the Public Administration are
an usual practice and their efficiency and competitiveness are
quite low. Many of them are claiming privatization for a
better allocation of resources.
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- Technological improvement and competitiveness are
necessary in the economy as a whole. The complete opening
to the EC competition is demanding a set of elements that go
beyond the price and are key success factors for firms.
Among them are : (1) Organization and strategy, (2) Effot on
R + D, (3) Adequate human capital formation, (4) Quality
achievement and complete understanding about the client's
needs and (5) Internationalization. From my personal view,
the government can play a very important role supporting
points (2), (3) and (5).
- Infrastructure development. The current stock of
infrastructure is fair lower than in the richer countries of the
EC. The level of insfrastructures in a country helps to achieve
efficiency lowering costs and promoting developing regions.
In that way, it contributes to the country's wealth and
welfare. The only problem is that the development of an
adequate stock of infrastruture takes its time and resources
that many times the public financing can't afford.
It's important to see that these factors are interrelated, The
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achievement of any of them depends in a high degree on the
achievements in the first one.
The purpose of this section is to deal with two main issues with
regard to the strategy of Spanish construction firms for the incoming
years. The first one is addressed to those market segments that offer
better growth prospects in the future. The second one will offer a
conceptual analysis about strategy in construction within the EC as a
whole. I will focus my attention on the Spanish construction.
The construction needs in Spain :
In spite of the effort undertaken in the last years Spain continues
having a large infrastructure deficit. Table 5.1 illustrates the main
differences and some of the areas where the gap is considerably
important.
Also, it's not only important this deficit, but also the pace is taking.
Table 5.2 shows the construction output in the EC and Spain. Year
1990, one of the years of the Spanish construction boom, gives an
idea of the construction volume of Spain relatively to the EC
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average. As can be seen, the distance between Spain and the richer
countries of the EC is large and increasing year after year because
of the relative lower annual output.
Table 5.1. THE SPANISH INFRASTRUCTURE DEFICIT
EUR- EUR-7 SPAIN
12 (b) (c) (c)/(a) (c)/(b)
(a)
Km of network/km 2 /Million inhab.
Highways 11,5 14,5 5,1 44 35
Roads in general 1028,7 1161,1 726,6 71 63
Railways 46,0 53,1 28,6 64 54
Subway 0,6 0,7 0,4 67 57
Total Network 1095,6 1241,2 760,7 69 61
Units/1000 inhab.
Housing 397 415 398 100 96
Hopital beds 8,1 8,9 4,4 54 49
Telephones 396 425 283 71 67
Energy consumption kwh/inh/year 5099 5402 3326 65 62
Source : Seopan. Annual Report. 1990
EUR-7: UK, France, W. Germany, Italy, Denmark, Netherlands and Belgium.
EUR-12: Includes EUR-12 and Spain, Ireland, Protugal, Greece and Luxemburg.
Spain has an infrastructure stock close to 60% of the European
Community average. In that way, Spanish Construction offers very
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positive prospects for the medium-long run. But for that, two factors
are necessary. The first one in the Public Administration
commitment and the second is the rising of the necessary funds.
Table 5.2. DIFFERENCES IN CONSTRUCTION OUTPUT. 1990.
Source : ECIF. Euroconstruct.
Among the construction sectors with more promising future in
Spain are :
- Housing. Nowadays there is a growing demand for house
building. Particularly for medium rent families that can't
afford very expensive housing. The demographic trend in
Europe also assures that the South of Europe has the best
prospects for new housing construction demand ( See Table
5.3).
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- Tourism and Leisure also offer growing prospects if Spain is
going to follow the 'California Development Model'. We
don't have to forget that Spain presents one of the best
climates and the longest shoreline of Europe. A lot is to do
improve quality and capacity to satisfy this demand in the
future.
Table 5.3. DEMOGRAPHICS: EUROPE AND SPAIN.
Population ( Million ) Active Population ( Million)
1985 2025 1985 2000 2025
North 82,7 83,5 40,6 42,2 39,4
South 142,6 159,4 56,4 62,8 62,4
West 154,2 150,1 70,8 71,3 61,7
EUROPE 379,5 393,0 167,8 176,3 163,5
SPAIN 39,2 43,3
Source: CONSTRUMAT -3. March 1990.
- Renovation and Maintenance. There are two important
reasons to assume that this sector will grow very fast in
Spain. Firstly the lack of infrastructure to be mantained or
renovated in the past - as is shown in the share of renovation
in total construction output - and secondly, as population is
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getting older it will demand not only higher quality but also
and stronger interest in renovation and maintenance.
- Development of new transportation infrastructure network.
In spite of the recent improvements in the transportation
infrastructure, the demand is growing very fast. In a few years
this network will need to increase its capacity and new
highways will have to be built.
- The water sector. It includes storage, distribution and waste
water management. The water consumption in Spain has
increased considerably in the last decade while there hasn't
been any important hydrologic program. Each day the needs
are higher and water is a more scarce resource, both, in
quantity and quality. Therefore, water is an asset to manage
properly before and after using it. In that way the EC has
issued a Directive obligate to install a waste water treatment
plant in those population center over 25.000 inhabitants.
These are basically those sectors that offer a good future in Spain
and some of them can be considered common to other EC
countries. The needs are huge. Maybe too much for a Public
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Administration alone. Therefore, it can be expected the
involvement of the private sector in two ways : (1) financing and (2)
operation and facilities management.
The privatization phenomenom has been a growing process in the
last two decades in many developed countries. Its justification
usually lies on the gains of efficiency and competitiveness that, at
the end, give a better allocation of the economy's resources.
Nontheless, there have been traditionally 4 basic reasons argued
for the government intervention through the correction of market
failures. These are : (1) The existence of externalities not measured
through any price mechanism, (2) The existence of public assets
where the market is not able to offer enough supply due to the
marginal cost is 0 and/or there isn't any possibility to avoid the
enjoying of the asset, (3) The existence of increasing returns to scale
determining natural monopolies and (4) The lack of competition in
the market appearing monopolies and oligopolies'.
1 ECONOMISTAS. Number 49. April-May 1991. Gonzalez, A and Lorenzo, MJ. "An analysis
of privatization policies. Objectives and controversies".
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The first two reasons are nowadays in question. R. H. Coase, 1991
Nobel Prize, has critized that these two theories haven't been
correctly analyzed in the past and afirms in his work " The problem
of the social cost ' (1960) that : " if the parts involved in a
transaction can negotiate and agree without incurring in any cost,
the final solution will be the optimum and independent of the
property rights scheme ".
If Coase is certainly right, the privatization of many public services
- currently operated by public companies or institutions - would find
a very important theoretical support able to mitigate those
arguments argued against their transfer to the private sector by their
monopolistic character.
Current experiences are oriented in this way. The privatization
process is just starting in many countries and Spain can't escape
from this process. Furthermore, the public financing resources are
each day more limited in comparison with the volume of
infrastructures and public services necessary to supply.
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In this scenario is fair to suppose an increasing demand in public
services supplied by private firms where the role of the public
authorities will be the control and supervision of a certain number
of previous conditions regarding to price, quality, service guarantee,
etc.
There are many fields related to construction where the private
sector has an strong inertia to participate :
TRANSPORTATION: HYDROLOGY: ENVIRONMENT: URBAN FACILITIES:
- Highways - Water - Waste disposal - Public Garages
- Tunnels distribution management - Hospitals
- Airports - Water - Urban planning
- Raiways treatment
In all these cases the private sector can offer the complete package
- from financing to planning and desing through construction and
management -. In that way, the facility management and operation
will serve as a way to collect the funds invested and a rate of return
through the life of the project.
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Many schemes can be found to carry out those projects although
it's always required to analyze case by case. The financial
engineering techniques offer many financing instruments in a
process of innovation to avoid all the obstacles that impede the
optimum matching between each project and its particular financing
needs.
Therefore, there are a wide spectrum of opportunities for
construction companies in the Spanish arena. The current deficit of
insfrastructures and equipment is a reality that anybody can elude.
In that way, the Spanish Government has recently announced and
investment program that will focus on the following items1 :
- Interior transportation within the major cities.
- A highways plan about 8.000 Km.
- A housing plan trying to accomodate family income to the
housing price.
- Allocation of funds for environmental protection.
- Others : Water storage and distribution, improvements in
the railways network, etc.
1ABC. Article. 5/21/1992.BC. rticle. 5/21/1992.
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At this moment the program is expected to have a duration about
15 years though year 2007 and its approximate budged is roughly 45
Trillion pesetas. This program already counts with a 15 Trillion-
peseta financing where 6 Trillion pesetas will be funded by the
private sector. Nontheless, it's not clear the management scheme
that will be adopted.
Now the big doubt is whether the program is going to start soon
and the pace is going to take. As I commented before, there is an
urgent need for some other reforms that should have priority. The
confidence in such program ( regarding to volume and timing ) is
questionable.
Competition environment and strategy within the EC:
The first question that anybody can ask about is EC is if the
Interior market is going to imply a true integrated or global-like
market for construction firms within the EC frontiers. In that way
we could explain the current movements undertaken by some
European firms as well as anticipate new future movements if these
are possible and respond to a coherent strategy.
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I've chosen a model of globalization that I find very useful to this
purpose. The model is the work of C.A. Solberg (1991) and presents
a very helpful scheme to explain the globalization process being also
a powerful tool for decision making1.
Globalization can be undestood as the process in which
production, distribution and marketing of goods and services by an
industrial group are done in an integrated way beyond the national
borders. Traditionally the different national markets have been
separated and only a few firms could operate in foreign countries.
Now, the process is general.
There are many industries that already present a global character
as the automobile industry, banking, computers, etc. Two seems to
be the requirements for a global behavior. First, the international
projection and second, this projection is carried out in an integrated
way, that is, under a common strategy.
11 Revista de Economia. Number 11. 1991. Alonso, J." The Spanish company and the international
markets ".
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Solberg indicates what forces push an industry towards
globalization and what forces work against it. Figures 5.1 and 5.2
illustrate respectively these forces.
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How does Construction in the EC match in these figures ?.
Looking at the construction indutry itself, it's certainly clear that
construction presents location economies due to its own
characteristics as was described in previous chapters. Furthermore, it
also presents a progressive increase in its products life cycle as a
result of the improvements in quality. An own characteristic of
construction is the durability of its products only subject in many
cases to maintenance works. The only weaker factor is the scale
economies, difficult to get in this industry. But there are
construction areas where they can be achieved such as financing,
general overhead, marketing or purchasing. Specialization also can
lead to dynamic scale economies through the learning process.
There are also some fields as prefabricated components where the
increasing returns to scale are clear.
The rest of factors pushing an industry towards globalization are
rather external to the particular industry. In the case of the Interior
Market it can be said that the objectives pursued by the Single Act
match perfectly in this context. From the elimination on physical
and fiscal barriers allowing free movement of capital, persons, goods
and services to the definition of same construction starndards, norms
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and rules. The improvement in information technologies and
communication networks will also help to the process.
All this factors are pushing construction to get global-like in the
EC context. From my personal view, this process is also encouraged
by the globalization of other parallel industries such as banking or
the internationalization of many construction clients - Real State
Developers, for example -. There are clear examples of this process.
Many Japanesse contractors entered in the US construction market
through the entry of Japanesse developers and other firms - building
automobile plants, etc. - getting in that way their first projects.
But if it's true that the forces mentioned before work facilitating
an industry to globalize, there are other set of forces impeding such
trend as is described in Figure 5.2. But construction seems to be not
very affected by such forces. Taste for variety is not an important
factor in this case. Construction firms are flexible enough to produce
custom-made facilities.
1 Foreign involvement in US Construction-related Industries ". A workshop. MIT. 10/23-25/1987.
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The only force that really threatens this process is the development
of new protectinism rules avoiding an open competition. The Single
Act in its Articles 85,86,92 and 93 prohibits anti-competitive
practices'. We don't have to forget that public administrations and
institutions represent in the most of the countries the main
construction client. If these institutions gave an special 'aid' to their
national contractors in purchasing construction contracts, the
competition would be distorted closing the possibility of many
companies to entry in other EC member countries. At this moment
the Public Purchasing Laws of some countries reserve the right to
invite to foreign construction firms to bid or this is done in a very
small number of cases.
1996 represents the year when the construction for the public
sector will be opened for transparent competition in the whole EC.
In Spain this will be translated in a higher level of competition. As
we know from previous sections the Spanish market is characterized
by a lower competition level than other European markets.
1
European Commission. " EEC. Competition policy in the Single Market".
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The imposition of the competition rules will lead to a more
transparent environment. Nevertheless, there will be a period of
transition. Year 1996 or 1997 could mean the final of this
transitional stage.
Taking positions in this new blobal-like environment, construction
companies have to define their strategy. Solberg proposes an
acheme of 9 possible strategies as is shown in Table 5.4.
It's important to recognize that this trend to globalization is
different depending on the market segment, sectors, and part of the
construction value chain. Therefore, it's not possible to talk about a
single strategy for a company but several options according to the
level where it operates, market and the ways it adopts its
international projection.
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Table 5.4. STRATEGIC OPTIONS
Companys preparation
to internationalization
h Entry in new markets Be prepared for Strengthen the globall-igh Entiy in new arkets
globalization position
Moderate Reinforce the export Expansion to Look for alliances al
markets international markets global niches
LOW Stay at home Development of Be prepared to be
international niches bought
Local Potentially global Global
Global Degree of the industry
Source : Solberg (1991)
In general, the construction industry within the EC is tending to
become global-like. Hence, construction in the EC can be classified
between a potentially global and a global industry. Nontheless, there
are some parts of the construction value chain that will remain in its
local, regional or national character due to its very fragmented
character where the possibility of achieving scale economies or
become competitive are rather difficult not offering an attractive
look for global strategies. This is the case of many subcontracted
works and small scale projects that although specialized don't
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require an avanced technology or aren't opened entirely to a large
number of competitors a is the case of many private demand
segments.
Assuming the line of thinking exposed above, it can be explained
the movements across the borders undertaken by some European
construction firms ( See chapter 4 ). How do Spanish firms fit in
that process ?. The preparation to internationalization of Spanish
construction firms is in the most of the cases low. A minor number
offers a moderate preparation. The acquisition, in full or in part, of
many Spanish firms by foreign groups responds clearly to Solberg's
scheme. From my point of view, the better preparation for
internationalization can be described as follows :
- Higher degree of organizational flexibility.
- Higher degree of technological development.
- Better management systems.
- Financial strength and turnover.
- More projection and experience abroad.
From this point, what are the strategies and challenges ro achieve
by Spanish construction firms in the next years ?. In first place it's
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important to notice that the international projection - whatever the
way and level this is - is a basic mechanism of every ofensive
strategy looking for a competitive position abroad but also for the
defense of the positions acquired in the domestic market. A firm
confining itself in the protection of its domestic market gives as
result a source of competitive disadvantages for the firm and a
vulnerability factor in favor of the foreign competition.
I would like to expose that doesn't exist a general strategy for all
the Spanish construction firms. Rather it's a matter of analysis on
case basis. Nevertheless, there is a set of strategies where each firm
can look for its particular position. The following sections define 3
general strategies that offer a conceptual framework of analysis as
well as the challenges to develop them.
A. INTERNATIONALIZATION
This strategy seems to be one of the most needed to undertake for
the many Spanish general contractors as well as those specialized
firms that can offer advanced technology in construction.
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The international involvement in construction of the Spanish firms
has been traditionally very low. This has implied a very low
improvement in technology and management systems. As a
consequence, improvements in productivity have been very small
under the protection of the domestic market. Lately this trend has
changed although the inflow of foreign companies to the Spanish
market has been much larger than the outflow of Spanish companies
to foreign markets.
There are three major disadvantages of competing abroad:
- Local firms have knowledge of consumer tastes, local
business customs, legal framework, suppliers, clients, culture,
language, etc.
- The firm operating abroad has to take some risks that local
firms don't. Among these additional risks are : Financial risks
( Changes in interest rates, inflation, foreign exchange rates )
and political risks. Governments play a very importan role in
these risks. The existence of export credits, insurances and
other means as financial or fiscal aids help to
internationalization. Financial agreements reached with
countries by the domestic government may be a good way to
171
reduce those risks and a way to entry in the market. This is
the case of some recent agreements between Spain and
Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, China or Morocco.
- There exist additional costs incurred by the firm working
abroad such as travelling or controlling the operations from a
much larger distance.
These factors offer a good framework analysis for the Transaction
Costs Theory. There are some basic options for a company trying to
entry in a foreign market :
- Acquisition of a local contractor ( in full or in part).
- Establishment of a filial company or a branch office.
- Joint Ventures with local partners.
At first sight all of them offer a good look but there are some
differences. The entry in a foreign market can be seen in a certain
way as a transaction to acquiere a market share - projects - abroad.
This entry can be achieved via market, via internal organization or
via an intermediate position. According to Williamson (1975) there
are three fundamentals that raise costs in the market with respect to
internal organization :
- Bounded rationality which reflects the inability of potential
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transactors to obtain an unlimited knowledge to make
decisions concerning transactions due to sociological and
language limitations.
- Information impacteness in the market, where information
necessary to transactions is known by one or more parties but
can't be obtained or displayed to other without cost.
- Opportunistic behavior as a consequence of the other
previous factors.
The three options described before can classified in the following
way. The acquisition of a local contractor implies a market
approach. The establishment of a filial company or branch office
implies a hierarchical or internal organization approach. Finally,
joint venturing reflects an intermediate position.
Now it could be wothwhile to analyze the advantages and
disadvantages of each of these approaches. Table 5.4 summarizes
them.
The market approach, acquisition, presents the following
advantages : (1) Direct access to a certain market share, (2)
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Acquisition of the local knowledge through the foreign firm's
current capabilities and (3) Direct control on operations. On the
other hand it presents the following disadvantages : (1) The price
payed in the acquisition may be too high, (2) It assumes to chose
the right firm for the strategy the buyer wants to pursue, (3) There
are always problems based on cultural differences such as language
or organizational culture when the buyer wants to impose his
criteria, (4) It requires a good deal of financial power and (5) It
reduces flexibility.
The other extreme, the establishment of a branch office or filial
has the following advantages : (1) Direct control and supervision on
operations, (2) Avoids opportunistic behavior. The disadvantages of
this approach are : (1) It still lacks of a deep market knowledge, (2)
It assumes a major portion of risks and uncertainty, (3) It doesn't
count on an initial market share, (4) It requires financial strength
and (5) It reduces firm's flexibility.
The intermediate approach, joint venturing, offers also its own
character and collects the adcantages from the other two approaches
although not their disadvantages that are rather based on
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organizational issues. The advantages are ; (1) Eliminates
uncertainty if the Joint Venture is undertaken with a local partner,
(2) It requires less financial resources than other solutions, (3) Easy
way to access to a market share, (4) Risks are shared and (5) It
doesn't reduce firms' flexibility. The disadvantages are : (1) It
requires a common set of goals and objectives, (2) It also requires
complementarity between the firms, (3) There are always cultural
problems based on their business cultural differences and (4) There
is always the threat of the partner to become a competitor.
From my point of view, I see the third approach as the best can fit
the purposes of the Spanish companies given its relative lack of
financial resources - in the most of the cases - and international
experience. The increasing number of joint ventures in all the
economic fields shows the strengths of this approach.
Nevertheless, no matter the approach taken there are some
requirements that Spanish companies have to meet. Not only to
compete internationally but also to defend its position in the
domestic market. Porter's (1985) generic strategies to compete in
any market segment and to achieve competitive advantage are : (1)
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Price competition, (2) Differentiation, achieving higher quality
and/or higher value added in the product and (3) Innovation, as a
way to achieve both price competition and differentiation1.
Table 5.4. WAYS TO ENTRY IN FOREIGN CONSTRUCTION
MARKETS.
Aquition Joint Venture Filial establishment
- Eliminates
uncertainty.
- Initial market share. - Lower finacial - Direct control.
Advantages - Local knowledge. requirements. - Avoids opportunistic
- Direct control - Market share. behavior.
- Risks are shared.
- Flexibility isn't
reduced
- Too much price. - Mutual trust. - Lack of local
- Choosing the right - Complementarity. knowledge.
Disadvantages firm. - Organizational and - Assumption of major
- Cultural differences. cultural differences, uncertainty.
- Financial power. - Threat of partner to - Initial market share.
- Reduces flexibility become a competitor. - Reduces flexibility.
Source : Own analysis.
Applying these concepts to the Spanish construction, these
competitiveness can be achieved with a higher degree of attention to
the following issues that seem to have been usually forgotten in the
past and in one way or other lead to quality ( differentiation ) and
productivity ( price competition ) :
- Continual upgrading of structures and management systems.
Michael Porter. " Competitive Advantage ". 1985.
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Looking for more flexible and decentralized structures with
better qualified managers.
- Improvement of control and information systems.
- Investment in R + D in two ways :
+ Physical equipment, capital, construction
procedures, etc.
+ Human capital. Personnel formation, in-house
programs, etc.
- Better strategic planning with special attention to those
market segments which offer good prospects anticipating in
some way the demand and developing the necessary internal
firms' infrastructure for it. This is the case of the construction
packages and/or facilities management.
- Special concern about quality. This issue will be an
important factor within the EC because of the new
requirements about guarantees and responsibilities during
and after the construction process. This also includes
attention to safety.
- A look to most competitive markets as Japan or US can
provide a good source to acquire the needed management
techniques and knowledge.
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- Closer positioning to the private sector. Spanish
construction firms are highly dependent on public sector.
New products and services can be develop trying to meet
better the client's particular needs. In Spain, for example,
construction management contracts are starting to be
introduced by foreign firms.
B. VERTICAL INTEGRATION
Vertical integration can be defined as the decision by the firm to
utilize internal transactions rather than market transactions to
accomplish its economic purposes.
As was seen in previous chapters the main Spanish contractors had
integrated forwards through Real State and other sectors. In the
same way, many small contractors have become Real State
developers. Undoubtely, this movement forwards can be justified by
the demand boom after the entry of Spain in the EC in 1986.
On the other hand, other Spanish contractors have integrated
backwards but in a minor number. The main fields in this direction
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have been design-engineering and construction material such as
prefabicated components.
The decision of internalization of some activities included in the
construction value chain is not an easy task and uses to have many
pitfalls. From a general view it can be said that vertical integration
is successful only when the activities added to the firm's main
activity lead to reinforce its strategy - price competition,
differentiation or both - through gaining competitive advantage
among the different activities performed.
There exist benefits when the following issues are present':
- Economies of integration. These economies can be reached
when the output volume is enough to achieve : (1)
Economies of combined operations eliminating or reducing
intermediate activities such as handling, transportation, etc.,
(2) Economies of information that can be shared among all
the activities, (3) Economies of internal control and
coordination, (4) Economies of avoiding the market and
Michael Porter (1980).Competitive Strategy. "The strategic analysis of vertical integration".
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therefore the transaction cost derived from it and (5)
Economies of stable relationships with buyers-suppliers.
- Access to knowledge of the technology. In some way is a
form of economy of information. Prefabricated materials, for
example, can be produced according to the construction
methods and equipment the firm has or viceversa.
- Assure supply and/or demand. Construction firms that are
integrated towards the Real State sector can have assured a
certain volume of work in economic slumps.
- Elevate entry and mobility barriers. If the firm achieves
competitive advantage through integration automatically
reduces the possibility of the entry of new competitors.
- Enter in a higher-return business. Assuming no economies
of integration, the movement of many Spanish contractors to
Real State can be seen by the substantial returns this market
has offered.
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The benefits have been exposed but there are some strategic costs
derived from vertical integration. These are1:
- Costs of overcoming mobility barriers. That is, the costs of
entry in an adjacent business. Particularly important when
there are large capital requirements or proprietary
technology. This is not the case of the construction related
activities. Becoming a Real State developer or a producer of
construction materials doesn't require large amounts of
capital or a very sophisticated technology.
- Increased operating leverage. Integration reduces the firm
flexibility because it increases the fixed costs base and at the
end all the activities depend on the final product sold.
Slumps in the market - characteristic in the construction
business - can seriously affect to the firm as a whole.
- Higher overall exit barriers. Integration implies
specialization of assets, strategic relationships or emotional
ties to a business. This is true in the construction business
1 Michael Porter (1980). Competitive Strategy. "The strategic analysis of vertical integration".
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where the change to other activities, professions or jobs and
hence, businesses, can hardly be undertaken.
- Foreclosure of access to know-how. Being a produce/buyer
of your own products/services implies in some way to forget
about competition and clients needs and therefore, getting
out the competition and technological improvements. Selling
and/or buying in the open market can avoid the risk of
becoming not competitive or not updated.
- Mantaining balance. When the capacity to sell or buy some
products exceeds the own internal needs, the firm has to find
some way out for its products or sacrify its market position.
This is certainly very difficult when competitors may be
reluctant to deal with the firm for fear of getting second
priority or to avoid strengthening their competitor's position.
- Differing managerial requirements. This is an extremely
important issue ussually forgotten. Each activity requires its
own techniques and its own managerial skills. Real State, for
example, can offer similar skills to construction business
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during the production process but is certainly different from
other activities as marketing or financing that requires
different expertise.
It's very important to consider that between market and internal
hierarchy there is a variety of quasi-integrated or orgational forms
that become true competitors of the integrated and non integrated
firms. These forms are :
- Minority equity investment.
- Prepurchase credits.
- Exclusive dealing agreements.
- Cooperative R + D.
- Joint venturing.
The main benefit of these alternatives is that doesn't affect to the
firm flexibility, critial point in the construction business.
From my personal view and also collecting some opinions1, the
EC will strengthen the relation between size and competitiveness.
This assesment is not enough to justify the vertical integration of a
Revista de Economia. Number 11. 1991. Salas, V. "The large diversified firm".
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firm, that being so, doesn't compete in the market but internally or
quasy-internally.
It could be even argued that the EC will favor the specialization
and disintegration as a consequence of a higher demand volume.
C. HORIZONTAL DIVERSIFICATION
Horizontal diversification in construction firms can be defined in
two wide fields. Firstly, those activities or sector related to the
construction business and secondly, those sectors and activities that
are unrelated.
During the 60's and early 70's an extensive diversification process
took place in US given the idea that combining different but related
business could create value through synergy. But now this
phylosophy is changing. Unrelated or marginally related businesses
adding during the earlier phases of diversification have been sold
off. Therefore, horizontal diversification is tending to related
businesses and the concept of synergy is changing towards pursuing
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interrelationships among the different business units to reduce costs
or enhance differentiation in virtually any activity in the value
chain'.
According to Porter, horizontal strategy is a concept of group,
sector and corporate strategy based on competitive advantage, not
on financial considerations or market perceptions. Without and
horizontal strategy there is not convicing rationale for the existence
of a diversified firm because it's little more than a mutual fund.
Horizontal strategy - not portfolio management - is thus the essence
of any corporate strategy.
In Europe many construction firms have initiated in the mid 80's
horizontal strategies pushed by new growing demands looking for
more stable businesses and related to the traditional activity. In
Spain this process has timidly started with a certain delay.
Williamson also explains the horizontal diversification through the
high costs and unefficiencies given by the transactions between the
firms that obligate to the firms to explore them internally. Firms
M. Porter (1985). " Competitive advantage ".
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diversify if there are important synergies'. These synergies can be
better understood if we consider that the internal and external
information the firm has, may be used or shared in other activities
through its technological capital, human capital and commercial
capital - knowledge about the market, clients, etc -.
The successful diversified firm can be that able to achieve those
interrelationships among units not always easy to find and
understand requiring a deep analysis that goes beyond financial
considerations. Diversification alone leads to reduce risks of
economis slumps but it doesn't lead to any comparative advantage
and therefore, it's not sustainable. Many times diversification
without any horizontal strategy only acts draining resources from
those activities where a corporation or firm has truly comparative
advantage.
The same said about vertical integration can be applied for
horizontal-related diversification. On the one hand, the EC can
bring a new environment favouring specialization and disintegration
as a result of a larger market. On the other hand, there are other
Williamson, O. (1985). "The Economic Institutions of Capitalism "
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organizational forms that can become true competitors of the
diversified firm as joint venturing, for example. The choice among
the different organizational forms is something that can't be
analyzed on general basis but on case basis depending on the firm.
The Spanish market will offer many opportunities in the future for
those construction companies chosing well defined horizontal
strategies. Privatization of many public services is a clear example.
Now, there are still some prioritary challenges that construction
firms have to pursue.
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CONCLUSION
The economic evolution of Spain during the decade of the 80's has
presented two clear periods with very different character. On the
one hand, the first half of this decade was characterized by slow
growth derived from the last oil crisis and the social and political
tensions. Investment in this period was fair low and inflation and
unemployment presented very high rates.
On the other hand, the second half of the 80's has had a very
different character. Social and political stability was achieved and
the country was openened to international markets. The main event
of this period has been the entry of Spain in the European
Community. Investment has shown and incredible growth aimed by
the public sector through an expansionary fiscal policy with its main
achievements in the infrastructures program and also, by the huge
foreign capital inflow that has also fueled investment. The result has
been a growth higher than the rest of the EC and OECD countries.
Now, in the first stages of the 90's, Spain shows a modern look
through two symbols, The World Fair EXPO'92 in Sevilla and The
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Olyimpics in Barcelona. But this prosperity is being threatened by
the economy's unbalances. A continuous growth had required some
sacrificies and efforts from all the individuals in the economy, from
citizens to Public Administrations and Institutions.
Therefore, the prospects about the Spanish economy have radically
changed in the beginning of the 90's. Two major unbalances, the
high current account deficit and inflation over the EC average, are
leading the economy to a recession. A recession that is also taking
place in other developed countries.
But all this in taking place while Spain is following the integration
in the EC. Year 1993 implies the elimination of the most of the
trade barriers, fiscal and physical, in the EC. It also implies the free
movements of goods, services, persons and capitals and therefore, a
new competition environment, broader and larger, with a set of
rules included in the Single Act that elimimate the possibility of
distorting competition.
In this context - that means more than free trade - Spain is one
step backwards. The improvements carried out in infrastructure and
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the strong investment process haven't been enough to improve
productivity. On the contrary, our productivity hasn't grown as much
as it should - our start point has also been behind the EC average -
and salaries have done faster than the EC average. Labor market is
very rigid and Unions have too much bargaining power.
Furthermore, savings rate has fallen while consumption has
boosted. The Public Deficit is also large. As result Spain has
become more dependent on the foreign capital. Now, foreign capital
is starting to lose condifence.
There aren't many solutions to fix the situation and the solutions
are painful in a moment that next elections are close - may be
closer than it's expected -. These solutions, recommended from
several institutions as IMF or OECD, are undoubtely addressed to
the public sector of the economy. There are many urgent reforms
that should be undertaken as soon as possible. Unemployment
fraud, black economy, public spending control, inefficient
bureaucracy in the Public Administrations, subsidies to public
companies, etc. are some of the main fields to act. The Spanish
growth and development in the long run depends primarily on it.
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These reforms and solutions are not something that depends on
the Maastrich rules but something that any country open to
international competition needs and can be summarized as a gain in
efficiency and competitiveness. Unfortunately, the only strong
specialized industry in the country is tourism and there hasn't been
any significant active industrial policy or strong support to
internationalization as has been the case of other countries. The last
opportunities are almost over.
Construction hasn't escaped from all the issues described before. It
has also shown two clear evolution periods during the 80's. The first
half meant the continuation of a crisis in the sector that started in
1973. This crisis hit very hard to the Spanish construction firms. The
second half has been along with the economy, a very prosperous
period in which many construction firms have improved is balance
sheet because of the boom experienced in Civil Engineering, and
Building - Commercial and Residential - construction.
Nowadays, the sector is far from those happy days. The cut in
official bidding derived from the lack of funds and spending control
is being accompanied by the slowdown in private investment. The
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surplus capacity built from the supply side is starting to suffer the
consequences. In fact, the selection process has already started in
construction as a whole. From construction firms to other firms
operating in construction subsectors. All the activities are showing a
considerably slowdown. The short term doesn't offer very good
prospects for the Spanish construction. Something that is also
happening in Europe. The construction boom is over. Growth is
slower. Spanish construction is expected to have a negative growth
in 1992 continuing the recession even until 1995.
The entry of Spain in the EC has affected and will affect even
more to the Spanish construction. Not only because of the structural
funds received from Bruselas but also because of the global-like
character that this industry will present in the next future. Many
foreign companies have already seen this issue. That explains the
entry of many of them in the Spanish construction market aimed
also by the large potential that offers - a large infrastructure deficit -
as well as the low degree of competition in comparison with their
domestic markets. The Spanish construction market in general and
the Public sector in particular, could be less transparent than it's
suppossed to be.
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Assuming that the needed reforms in the economy are successfully
undertaken, Spain could enjoy a prosperous future in the economy
as a whole and construction in particular. The infrastructure needs
are clear but its price very expensive.
There are many construction sectors that offer good opportunities
in the long run. Many of them are relatively new for Spanish
companies. Renovation and Maintenance, Civil Engineering through
transportation infrastructures, and Housing will be pushed by the
demand. But there are other construction-related sectors such as
Environment, Facilities Management, or Public Services that could
find a very important growth through privatization.
Spanish construction firms should prepare for this new
environment. The entry of foreign competitors in the Spanish could
damage its current position while Spanish firms haven't entered in
international markets or this has been done in a very small number
of cases. This lack of international experience along with the
protectinism in the domestic market has meant a poor concern
about competitiveness and the ways to achieve it. The Interior
Market will mean the elimination of such protectinism.
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Internationalization is the first challenge for the main Spanish
General Constractors and other specialized firms. This strategy
reveals itself as the best way to defend the domestic position and a
source of competitive advantage. Nontheless there are many
construction activities and market segments that offer a local,
regional or national character that will be exposed in the a minor
degree to the EC competition.
The best way can fit the internationalization purposes of the
Spanish firms is Joint Venturing. A growing practice nowdays where
the firms' environment are more complex and requires flexible
organizational forms.
There are also two more possible strategies for Spanish
construction firms. Their competitors started vertical integration and
diversification processes before the Spanish Companies. Spanish
firms are poorly diversified or integrated. These processes only can
be understood when they lead to strengthen the competitive position
of a firm - price competition, differentiation or both -. There are
many pitfalls in them.
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Horizontal Integration is often mismatched with financial risk
diversification. Porter indicates that this view isn't sustainable for
long. The only reson that really justifies any diversification process -
or vertical integration - is exploiting interrelationships and linkages
among the activities the firm or business units perform as a source
of competitive advantage leading to reinforce the strategic position.
Therefore, unrelated or marginal-related horizontal diversification
should be out of any consideration by Spanish Construction Firms.
There is also a doubt. The Interior Market could favor size and
competitiveness. This may imply favouring specialization and
disintegration as a consequence of a larger market and therefore,
integration and diversification strategies only have to be observed
when there are very strong linkages and interrelationships to
achieve.
But whatever the strategy the Spanish firms take there is a set of
areas that require special attention and improvements. These are :
- Continual upgrading of structures and management systems.
Looking for more flexible and decentralizaed structures with
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better qualified managers.
- Improvement of control and information systems.
- Investment in R + D. In two ways :
+ Physical equipment, capital, construction
procedures, etc.
+ Human capital, Personnel formation, in-house
programs, etc.
- Better strategic planning with special attention to those
market segments which offer good prospects anticipating in
some way the demand and developing the internal firm's
infrastructure ncessary for it. This is de case of construction
packages and/or facilities management.
- Special concern about quality. This issue will be an
important factor within the EC because od the new
requirements about guarantees and responsibilities during
and after the construction process. This also includes
attention to safety.
- A look to most competitive markets as Japan or US can
provide a good source to acquire the needed management
techniques and knowledge.
- Closer positioning to the private sector. Spanish
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construction firms are highly dependent on public sector.
New products and services can be develop trying to meet
better the client's particular needs. In Spain, for example,
construction management contracts are starting to be
introduced by foreign firms.
These are the main challenges. The Interior Market can be a
source of threats for those pretending to ignore its consequences
but, and this is the main point, it will be the
accomplishment of important opportunities for those who go to their
conquest. 1993 is tomorrow.
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